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"[I]t would be more appropriate to speak of human rights as the vocabulary of our
time rather than the idea of our time: it provides the terms in v.hich dicussion of.
.. values in international politics is carried on." - R. . Vincent
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INTRODUCTION
After exploring outer space and cyberspace, scientists are now returning to a
more local but perhaps more challenging frontier human genetics.' The progress
of genetic research has accelerated dramatically over the past fifteen years,'
marked most recently by the Human Genome3 Project, an international effort to
map and document humanity's genetic resources.4
Scientists are focusing primarily on the development of tests to diagnose genetic
conditions 5 and surgical techniques to treat them.6 The potential of genetic tech-
1. Genetics is the study of biological functions that transmit hereditary characteristics
and create physical and behavioral variation among living beings. Waasm's II NEw
RrVERsIDE UNrvERsrrY DICTIONARY 525 (1984) [hereinafter WEBSTER]. This Comment re-
fers to "human genetics" as the study of genetics applied to the human species.
2. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, in
CoNTEMPoRARY IssuEs IN BioETIcs 637 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter Billings Surveys] (discussing rapid development of genetic tests over
the last decade); W. French Anderson, Human Gene Therapy, in CoNTE'ORARY IssuEs IN
BIOETHICS, supra, at 659 (describing successful uses of retroviruses in the early 1980s to
transfer genes in gene therapy experiments); Mary Wamock, Ethical Challenges in Embryo
Manipulation, BITrr. MED. J., Apr. 18, 1992, at 1045 (stating that scientists are collecting
new data on human genetics with extraordinary speed); Darrell E. Ward, Gene Therapy: The
Splice of Life; Ethical Implications, USA TODAY (MAGAZINs), Jan. 1993, at 63 (noting that
scientific progress in the detection of new hereditary diseases is moving so quickly that re-
searchers refer to the "gene of the week").
3. A genome is all of the genetic material in the cells of an organism. Glossary, in GENE
MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETIcs AS GUIDEs 277 (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds.,
1992). The human genome comprises all of the genetic material in the human species. Id.
4. See id. at 278 (defining "Human Genome Project" as the United States-funded com-
ponent of the international initiative to map humanity's genetic resources and develop new
techniques for genetic analysis). Government research bodies and private companies from
several countries have guaranteed three billion dollars to fund the Human Genome Project
over fifteen years. RuTH HuBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENF MYTH 3 (1993).
The Project is scheduled for completion in 2005. Victor A. McKusick, The Human Genome
Project: Plans, Status, and Applications in Biology and Medicine, in GENE MAPPING: USING
LAW AND ET-cs As GUIDES, supra note 3, at 622. For more background on the Human Ge-
nome Project, see generally Alexander lv. Capron, Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the
"Threat" ofModern Genetics, in CoNTSMhoRARY IssuEs IN Bio --ncs, supra note 2, at 629
(outlining objectives of Human Genome Project as background for a discussion of the dan-
gers of genetic screening); Alasdair T. Iles, Comment, The Human Genome Project: A
Challenge to the Human Rights Framework, 9 HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 27 (1996) (advocating
the use of human rights analysis to confront potential social consequences of the Human
Genome Project).
5. This Comment defines "genetic conditions" broadly to mean any disease, disability,
disorder, physical or behavioral trait, or predisposition (susceptibility) that is genetically-
linked.
6. See Capron, supra note 4, at 630 (noting that scientific efforts have traditionally fo-
cused on gene therapy and only recently on genetic screening); Sherman Elias et al., Carrier
Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: A Case Study in Setting Standards of Medical Practice, in
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nology7 to alleviate the physical, emotional, and financial pain of disease makes
this technology extremely attractive. It may, however, create mechanisms of so-
cial control that evoke fierce ethical debate.9 Practiced widely, genetic testing'0 and
gene therapy" could invite institutionalized discrimination against people predis-
posed to certain conditions,12 repression of socially undesirable behavioral or
physical traits,13 and a rise of a popular eugenics 14 movement.15
The potential for discrimination raises many questions in international human
rights law' 6 about the legal status of genetic groups, 7 the rights of posterity, and
GEmN MAPPING: USING LAW A E'mcs As GumEs, supra note 3, at 186, 200 (predicting
that the Human Genome Project will encourage development of "tens, if not hundreds" of
new genetic screening tests that will compete for widespread use).
7. This Comment refers to genetic testing and germ-line manipulation collectively as
"genetic technology" or "genetic innovations."
8. See Ward, supra note 2, at 63 (describing both the suffering that victims of genetic
disease and their families experience and the costs of treating afflicted patients).
9. See Bob Groves, Building a BetterBeing? An Edics Debate, RncoIum, Feb. 22, 1993,
at BI (stating that for twenty years, critics have debated what kinds of genetic manipulation
are morally justifiable).
10. See infia notes 22-26 and accompanying text (defining genetic testing and explain-
ing its purposes).
11. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (defining gene therapy and explaining
its purposes).
12. See infi notes 53-63 and accompanying text (explaining discriminatory practices
that can result from widespread use of genetic technology).
13. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of germ-line
manipulation).
14. Eugenics is the use of genetic controls to enhance the human race. Ward, supra note
2, at 63. HIstorically, governments instituted eugenic policies to "cleanse" the citizenry of
morally or biologically weak individuals (negative eugenics) and promote the breeding of
healthy individuals (positive eugenics). Robert N. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics: How
Fair is the Comparison?, in GENE MAPPiNG: USING LAW Aim ETHICS As Guimms, supra note
3, at 60 (describing eugenics as state-managed social control). Eugenics ex.prienced its
golden age under Germany's Nazi regime, wvich instituted legislation requiring the sterili-
zation or "mercy killing' of many disabled people. Aamm Rooans & Dzms DUnRA D3
BousiNGEN, BIonni-cs iNEuRoPE 25-29 (1995). In the 1920s, U.S. law required the com-
pulsory sterilization of the mentally-ill, crippled, blind, dea& alcohol and drug addicts,
criminals and those afflicted with tuberculosis, syphilis, and other diseases. Ward, supra
note 2, at 63. Currently, several Asian countries promote or tolerate eugenic practices.
Romns & Ds BousmNN, supra, at 30. The governments of India and China permit the
systematic elimination of thousands of female fetuses after pre-natal examinations. Id at 30-
31. Authorities in Singapore offer grants to encourage wealthy, educated couples to have
children. Id.
15. See Billings Surveys, supra note 2, at 641 (arguing that surveys indicate a social
myth of genetic perfection that may be a form of eugenics).
16. Traditional international law generally governs relations betwen states and grants
legal rights to states and certain intergovernmental organizations to exercise against each
other. THOMAS BuERGENnIAL, INTERNATIONAL Humm Rirsm: IN A Ntrrsm T 2 (1988).
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
the nature of human rights violators and victims. International human rights or-
ganizations,1 however, may be inadequately equipped to address the state-of-the-
art legal issues that these innovations introduce.' 9 Genetic technology thus presents
an extraordinary human rights challenge because it is rooted in societal rather than
political power. It presents a conceptual paradox where governments safeguard
human rights, and parents, doctors, scientists, employers, and insurers jeopardize
them.
This Comment examines the responsiveness of traditional international human
rights concepts and agreements to the challenges of genetic technology. Part I de-
fines genetic testing and germ-line manipulation 2 -one form of gene therapy-
and analyzes their ethical implications using traditional human rights definitions
and international human rights instruments. 2' Part II examines how genetic
technology challenges traditional definitions of violators and victims in
international human rights law. Part IH evaluates whether proposed international
instruments addressing genetic technology recognize and adequately confront these
challenges. Part IV proposes broadened definitions of human rights concepts and
encourages international human rights organizations to market these revised
definitions at the state level. Rather than recommend regulation, this Comment
attempts to provide international actors with a revised human rights language with
which to regulate society's control over human diversity.
I(A). THE SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORK
A. GENETIC TESTING
Genetic tests are techniques that diagnose or predict whether a patient will de-
velop or be a carrier of a hereditary condition.2 These tests seek to identify people
By contrast, international human rights law focuses primarily on state obligations towards
the individuals within their borders, integrating individual rights into international law. t
Bilder, An Overview ofInternational Human Rights Law, in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP E.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 894, 895 (2d ed. 1995).
17. This Comment defines a "genetic group" broadly as any group of individuals with a
common genetic condition.
18. For purposes of this Comment, an international human rights organization is any
international governmental organization that creates international human rights law and
policy.
19. See Iles, supra note 4, at 44 (addressing several shortcomings of the existing human
rights framework within the context of the Human Genome Project).
20. See infra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (defining and explaining the purposes
of germ-line manipulation).
21. This Comment defines an "international instrument!' as a declaration or treaty
adopted by or entered into by many state parties on a global level.
22. Tabitha M. Powledge, Ethical and Legal Implications of Genetic Testing: A Synthe-
sis, in TBE GENoivm, ETmcs AND TE LAW: IssuEs N GENETIC TESTING 1, 3 (Am. Assoc. for
the Advancement of Science ed., 1992).
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who will be affected by a condition early in life, those who will be affected later in
life, and those who will remain unaffected but pass the gene on to their children
Currently, genetic tests can only reveal whether a patiente4 is likely to have a ge-
netic condition They cannot reveal the degree to which the condition will affect
the patient.
B. GEPi-LNE MANIPULATION
Gene therapy attempts to treat genetic conditions by giving predisposed patients
normal copies of defective or missing genes.27 Many geneticists believe that two
23. Id.
24. Scientists are also developing genetic tests to perform on embryos in a process
called "embryo diagnosis" or "pre-implantation diagnosis." Leroy Walters, Ethical Issues in
Human Gene Therapy, in Co~micPORARY ISSUES IN Bionmics, supra note 2, at 656. This
process is the initial step in both germ-line manipulation and selective pregnancy (also
called selective abortion). Id. (indicating that diagnosis allows parents to decide Whether to
discard or treat an embryo). An embryo is an organism in its early developmental stages,
before its cells have assumed specific bodily functions. WEBSTER, supra note 1, at 427. To
form embryos, doctors remove sex cells from each of the parents and fertilize them in a test
tube in a laboratory procedure called in vitro fertilization (W). Walters, supra, at 657. An
IVF clinic then uses pre-implantation diagnosis to detect potential genetic abnormalities in
an embryo before it begins to develop. Id. at 656. Parents choose %ulIether to continue the
pregnancy based on the results of the test See Arthur L. Caplan, The Ethics ofIn Fitro Fer-
tilization, in CommipoRARY ISSUES iN Bionmcs, supra note 2, at 219 (explaining the
"standard" process of IY). In selective pregnancy, doctors select and implant one or more
viable embryos into the mother's womb, hoping that one develops into a healthy fetus.
HUBBARD & WAL), supra note 4, at 113-14. About ten percent of pregnancies achieved
through IVF result in liveborn children, which is similar to the rate of births that result from
pregnancies caused by sexual intercourse. Id. For further background on IVF, see generally
Susan Sherwin, Feminist Ethics and In Vitro Fertilization, in CoT.aiU.RY ISsuEs IN
BIoT-rcs, supra note 2, at 224; J. Henahan, Fertilization: Embryo Transfer Procedures
Raise Many Questions, 252 JAMA 877 (1984). In germ-line manipulation, doctors use em-
bryo diagnosis to detect conditions that are responsive to gene insertion techniques. Walters,
supra, at 656.
25. HUBBARD & WALm, supra note 4, at 27. Gary Hodgen, the president of the Jones In-
stitute for Reproductive Medicine in Norfolk, Virginia, predicts that nithin "a handful of
years," scientists vill be able to perform preimplantation embryo screening for traits such as
eye color, hair color, and height Erik Parens, Autonomous Consumers: Respecting the
"Autonomy, Privacy, and Confidentiality" of Consumers in the Biotechnology Market,
HAsnNGS CTR. REP., July, 1994, at 3.
26. HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 27.
27. Pete Moore, GeneticManipulation, NEw ScmEr sT, Nov. 13, 1993, at I1. Genes are
segments of DNA that form the chromosomes in our body cells. HUBBARD & VWAW, supra
note 4, at 11. Chromosomes carry hereditary information. Id. Genes provide instructions for
the creation of proteins that are the building-blocks of the human body. Id. Genes transfer
hereditary characteristics by deciding whether and how fast the body Should make proteins
and how proteins should interact with one another. Idi
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forms of gene therapy-somatic cell manipulation28 (SCM) and germ-line ma-
nipulation (GLM)-will be available in the coming decades3" and will revolu-
tionize medicine by enabling patients to thwart disease.
3'
If testing reveals that an embryo has or is predisposed to a certain condition,
parents may use GLM to alter or correct it.32 GLM involves inserting33 normal
genes into the sex cells of a patient or, more feasibly, into the undeveloped cells of
28. Somatic cell manipulation, the more developed of the two forms of gene therapy,
involves inserting normal genes into somatic cells (cells that make up body tissues),
HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 109-10, such as lung cells in cystic fibrosis victims.
Ward, supra note 2, at 63. The new gene enables the cell to function properly. HuBBARD &
WAL), supra note 4, at 109. Unlike germ-line cells, somatic cells do not pass on hereditary
information to offspring. Ward, supra note 2, at 63. Therefore, SCM does not "erase" the
disease in a permanent sense; the effects of the inserted gene, both positive and negative, die
with the patient. Moore, supra note 27, at I1. The defective gene, though stunted in the pa-
tient, may pass to the patient's children. Id. SCM does not evoke as much controversy as
GLM because it puts less power in human hands. Id. In addition, SCM does not raise ques-
tions about the rights of future children to inherit an unmanipulated genome. See id. (ex-
plaining that germ-line manipulation raises issues about hereditary rights and lack of con-
sent of the unborn child).
29. For more background on germ-line manipulation, see generally John C. Fletcher &
W. French Anderson, Germ-line Therapy: A New Stage of Debate, J.L. MED. & H.ALTH
CARE 20 (1992); Eric Juengst, Human Germ-line Engineering, J. MED. & PHIL. 16 (1991);
Gregory Fowler et al., Germ-line Therapy and the Clinical Ethos of Medical Genetics,
THEORncAL MED. 10 (1989); Nelson A. Wivel, Germ-line Modification and Disease Pre-
vention: Some Medical and Ethical Perspectives, SCIENCE, 1993, at 262.
30. See Parens, supra note 25, at 3 (reporting that James M. Wilson, director of the In-
stitute for Human Gene Therapy at the University of Pennsylvania, predicted that GLM will
be feasible within his lifetime); see also Walters, supra note 24, at 655 (predicting that sci-
entists will propose to perform GLM on humans within the decade); Human Genetics
Committee, Council for Responsible Genetics, Position Paper on Human Germ Line Ma-
nipulation, in CoNTEMPORARY ISSUES iN BioETHIcs, supra note 2, at 668 (stating that scien-
tists perform widely both SCM and GLM on laboratory animals). In a widely reported GLM
experiment, scientists fertilized mouse eggs and inserted an extra gene into them that directs
the production of a growth hormone. Id. at 670. The growth hormone caused the mice to
grow to twice their natural size. Id.
31. See Sherman Elias & George J. Annas, Somatic and Germline Gene Therapy, in
GENE MAPPING: UsING LAW AND ETHICs As GuiDEs, supra note 3, at 150 (articulating the
efficiency argument that GLM may be used to prevent disease in future generations).
32. See EUGENE BRODY, BIom ICAL TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RoTs 131 (1993)
(describing the process of gene insertion in GLM to correct defective genes).
33. To insert a gene, scientists use a vector, a carefully controlled virus, to deliver the
gene to a site on the chromosome. Walters, supra note 24, at 656. The vector acts as an "un-
guided missile," randomly adding the gene to the original set of genes. Id. The desirable and
the undesirable gene therefore co-exist at different sites on the chromosome. Id. Scientists
hope to develop a "guided missile," a vector that can deliver a gene to a precise site on a
chromosome, so that the desirable gene replaces rather than upstages the undesirable gene.
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an early embryo that is fertilized in vitro? The technique can be used to cure ge-
netic diseases,35 to influence hereditary physical features, such as hair color,3s eye
color,37 height,38 and athletic ability? 9 It may also alter genetically-linked behav-
ioral features, such as personality,4 talent,41 intelligence,42 and, some argue, sexmal
orientatiom43 The effects of the genetic change, beneficial and harmful, pass on to
future generations." GLM can permanently alter the gene pool4s within a family.45
34. Elias &Annas, supra note 31, at 144.
35. See Walters, supra note 24, at 651 (explaining that GLM, if performed successfully,
would reduce or prevent the incidence of genetic disease among a patient's deacendants).
-36. See Groves, supra note 9, at BI (quoting Andrew Kimbrall, layer and policy di-
rector of the Foundation on Economic Trends, who argues that thousands of people vil
demand GLM to change their hair color and other physical characteristics).
37. See Barbara J. Culliton, Gene Theran. Researd in Public; With the First Human
Gene Trials on the Horizon, Extensive Review Procedures are Being Put in Place, Sciumcn
Feb. 1, 1985, at 493 (arguing that if GLM is used to cure diseases, it may also be used to
change eye color).
38. See Elias &Annas, supra note 31, at 147 (discussing the insertion of a gene coded
to produce a grovth hormone that will create a taller child).
39. Id. at 149. Because these traits are polygenic (determined by the instructions of sev-
eral genes), however, they are more difficult to alter and require advanced insertion tech-
niques that scientists do not anticipate wvill be available in the near future. Id.
40. See id. (stating that enhanced intelligence is one goal of eugenic gene therapy).
41. See Georges B. Kutukdjian, UNESCO and Bioethies; United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO CouRIum, Sept, 1994, at 23 (raising the
possibility that GLM research may narrowly focus on altering people's talents, abilities, and
abnormalities).
42. Id.
43. See HUBBARD & WArD, supra note 4, at 93-98 (discussing studies performed to
determine if sexaml orientation has a genetic component).
44. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 145 (stating that GLM involves a deliberate
decision to pass on genetic alterations to future generations); Human Genetics Committee,
supra note 30, at 669 (stating that GLM involves the introduction of a gene into a fEmily's
hereditary line); HuBBARD & WAmD, supra note 4, at 113 (stating that the purpose of G11
is to alter the genetic make-up of future people).
45. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 113 (stating that GLM alters the genetic
make-up of the future population). A "gene poor' is the total number of genetic combina-
tions in a population. SmmnN MoLNAR, RAcEs, TYPES, & EIMtc GRoUPs: THE PROBLI
OHumAN VARIATON 38 (1975).
46. See Human Genetics Committee, supra note 30, at 669 (stating that early embryonic
alterations result in germ-line modifications that pass from generation to generation, see
also HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 114 (vmrning that mistakes resulting from GLM
could permanently alter a hereditary line). Some scientists believe that v, iespread use of
GLM can substantially affect the genetic diversity of the human species. Sea, e.g, Tom
Wn.rin, PERmOUs KNovam : Tim Hmiw Gmo.i PRomcr ANm ITs IPUcATnos 160
(1993) (arguing that extensive GLM use would result in "major alterations" to human ge-
nome); BRODY, supra note 32, at 132 (discussing scientific concerns that GLM may reduce
genetic diversity among human populations); Andrea Bonnicksen, Genetic Dagnosis of
Human Embryos, HASTGS Cm REP., July-Aug., 1992, at S5 (recognizing tlat videspread
1997]
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Scientists successfully performed GLM on laboratory animals47 and have confi-
dence that they will overcome the technical obstacles4 of human application.4
embryo diagnosis may eliminate genetic diseases by the end of the decade). The Human
Genetics committee, in contrast, argues that GLM cannot eliminate "hannfuil" genes from
the human population as a whole. Human Genetics Committee, supra note 30, at 669. The
genetic make-up of the human race that has evolved over thousands of years cannot be eas-
ily overridden. See id. (arguing that the elimination of undesirable genes from the human
genome could only be accomplished over thousands of years through massive programs of
coercion, which are not feasible); Gina Kolata, Ethicists Wary Over New Gene Technique's
Consequences, N.Y. TiMas, Nov. 22, 1994, at CIO (quoting opinion of lawyer and ethicist
Alta Charo, who argues that because the genetic inheritance of the human race is immense,
using GLM to eliminate some genes will only marginally effect the gene pool). Moreover,
environmental factors such as diet, personal habits, socio-economic status, and occupation
affect genetic expression to a considerable extent Proctor, supra note 14, at 76-77; see also
HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 36 (criticizing the presumption that environmental fac-
tors play no role in genetic expression); Iona Jane Brown & Philippa Gannon, Confidential-
ity and the Human Genome Project: A Prophecy for Conflict?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
LAW, Mwicncm & Emcs 215, 216 (Sheila A. M. McLean ed., 1996) (asserting that many
genetic illnesses, such as Down's Syndrome, can arise from environmental rather than he-
reditary factors).
47. See supra note 30 (describing the progress of GLM experiments on mice that re-
ceive growth hormone).
48. See Elias &Annas, supra note 31, at 145. Current gene therapy techniques are inef-
ficient because they involve damaging instrument manipulation that requires attempts on
several embryos. Id. at 146; Human Genetics Committee, supra note 30, at 670. Technical
problems also arise because scientists do not fully comprehend how genes function. See id.
(asserting that biologists cannot predict how genes interact with one another or their envi-
romnent). At this point, scientists cannot deliver a gene to the precise site of a defective
gene on a chromosome. See supra note 33 (comparing the current method of gene insertion
to an "unguided missile"). An inaccurate insertion could disrupt or mutate other genes, po-
tentially causing cancer. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 146. Altering a genetic trait
may also have unexpected effects on how body cells interact, producing new gene combina-
tions that could damage future generations of offspring. See Human Genetics Committee,
supra note 30, at 670. Scientists may discover in the future that a defective trait today, may
be neutral or beneficial for other reasons. Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 146-47; BRODY,
supra note 32, at 132. For example, sickle cell trait, a condition which causes blood loss,
painful joints and infections, also increases resistance to malaria. Elias & Annas, supra note
31, at 146-47. Scientists cannot foresee when GLM techniques will be advanced enough to
alter physical traits, such as eye or hair color, which are polygenic, or controlled by many
genes. Id. at 149. Despite its technical obstacles, GLM may be easier to perform than SCM
in certain circumstances. Id. at 151; Robert Cooke, Experts Debating Gene Therapy,
NEWSDAY, May 21, 1991, at 59; see also HutBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 115 (indicat-
ing that sometimes embryonic cells are easier to manipulate than differentiated cells of
adults or children). SCM cannot be used to treat hereditary diseases of the central nervous
system. Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 150-51. Because inserted genes travel through a
person's blood, they cannot pass the blood-brain barrier and therefore cannot reach the tar-
get cells. Id, In such circumstances, the geneticist can only alter a cell before the distinction
between somatic and germ cells develops. Id. In fact, GLM was more effective than SCM in
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C. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Genetic testing and GLM have serious biological implications," but they create
social perceptions of "normality" that are even more dangerous.5' Together, the
social perceptions and biological realities create new issues for human rights
analysis.52
Institutions may use genetic screening " to discriminate against people predis-
posed to certain conditions.-4 Employers may use screening to select the most fit
employees in order to increase productivity, 5 reduce expenditures on insurance
benefits,5 6 and ameliorate pressure to ensure safe working conditions. 7 Insurance
several experiments using laboratory animals because the undifferentiated (unspecialized)
embryonic cells accepted and processed the new gene more easily than the spweialized body
tissue cells of a more developed organism. Human Genetics Committee, supra note 30, at
670.
49. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 145 (stating that scientific advances in gene
therapy are developing more quickly than expected); P. Elmer-Dewitt, T7he Perils of Trading
on Heredity, Th s, Mar. 20, 1989, at 71 ("Like atomic energy, genetic engineering is an ir-
resistible force that will not be wished or legislated away.").
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of GLM and em-
bryo diagnosis on a family's gene pool).
51. See Proctor, supra note 14, at 59 (arguing that the use of genetic technology is not
as dangerous as social misperceptions about its utility).
52. See Billings Surveys, supra note 2, at 638 (explaining that discrimination can result
from real or perceived genetic differences).
53. "Genetic screening" is genetic testing performed on populations rather than indi-
viduals. Glossary, in Gm MAPPwnG: USamG LAW AND Ermics As GiMFS, supra note 3, at
186.
54. See McKusick, supra note 4, at 633-34 (arguing that extensive genetic screening
practices may jeopardize employability and insurability of many people with genetic condi-
tions).
55. See HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 131 (explaining that genetic screening may
be used to predict a worker's effectiveness); Proctor, supra note 14, at 72 (explaining that in
the 1970's, many companies screened for carriers of sickle-cell anemia vwhom they feared
would perform poorly and consume medical resources); McKusick, supra note 4, at 634
(arguing that employers will use genetic screening to avoid hiring wvorkem vho are often
sick and therefore expensive trainees and unreliable employees); George I. Anas &
Sherman Elias, Social Policy Research Prionities for the Human Genome Project, in Gmn
MAPPiNG: USING LAW Am ETHICS As GuuDEs, supra note 3, at 273 [hereinafter Research
Priorities] (arguing that employers may use genetic screening to lower training costs or
maintain a high experience level among employees).
56. See HuBBARD & WID, supra note 4, at 131 (stating that employers may use ge-
netic screening to reduce insurance costs); MoKusick, supra note 4, at 634 (arguing that
employers who pay for part of their employees' health care have an interest in hiring people
who are less likely to generate high medical costs); Research Priorities, supra note 55, at
273 (arguing that employers will use genetic screening to exclude individuals who ould
increase company health bills).
57. See HUBBARD & WArl), supra note 4, at 133 (arguing that widespread genetic
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companies, who already discriminate based on age, gender, and profession,58 may
begin to require personal genetic data for consideration when fixing premiums and
granting coverage.59 Schools may use the results of genetic screening to justify in-
adequate accommodation of the educational needs of their students.6 Adoption
agencies may use the results of genetic tests to reject prospective parents.61 Wide-
spread, institutionalized screening practices can create a "genetic underclass" 62 that
society marginalizes based on factors beyond its control.63
GLM offers individuals unprecedented control over the genetic make-up of
their descendants 6'4 While scientists often praise GLM as an efficient form of pre-
ventive medicine,65 many scholars worry that its use will invite a general accep-
tance of eugenics. 66 Used in this manner, GLM may allow parents to prevent their
children from having mild disabilities67 or design their children's hereditary physi-
screening in the workplace could lead to lax enforcement of safety precautions).
58. See Proctor, supra note 14, at 72-73 (stating that insurers discriminate based on age,
gender, occupation, place of residence, cholesterol level, and blood pressure); HuBBARD &
WALD, supm note 4, at 140 (arguing that insurance companies make a business out of dis-
crimination because they base their decisions on factors such as sex, age, and occupation).
59. See Proctor, supra note 14, at 73 (arguing that insurers will increasingly rely on ge-
netic information to determine insurance rates, resulting in genetic discrimination);
HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 141; McKusick, supra note 4, at 633 (arguing that ge-
netic screening may allow insurers to broaden the class of pre-existing or foreseeable condi-
tions that do not receive coverage); Billings Surveys, supra note 2, at 639 (arguing that ge-
netic screening may result in the use of genetic "labeling" to deny employment or insurance
coverage). The Billings Surveys analyzed 29 claims of genetic discrimination describing 41
separate incidents of discrimination, 39 of which involved employers or insurers. Id. at 638.
60. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 128-30 (arguing that genetic tests may be
used to excuse schools for poor academic performance among students).
61. See Billings Surveys, supra note 2, at 641 (arguing that agencies that deny adop-
tions based on genetic information exhibit eugenic prejudice, which assumes that the
healthiest families make the best families).
62. Proctor, supra note 14, at 74 (asserting that discrimination by employers and insur-
ance companies could create a genetic underclass).
63. See HUBBARD & WALt), supra note 4, at 140 (stating that insurance companies
group people according to factors they cannot control).
64. See BRODY, supra note 32, at 39 (stating that technology has dramatically expanded
human capability to affect the evolution of the human species).
65. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 150 (articulating the argument that GLM may
prevent diseases, eliminating the need for SCM in subsequent generations); Human Genetics
Committee, supra note 30, at 668 (explaining that GLM can avoid multiple treatments of
SCM).
66. See, e.g., Human Genetics Committee, supra note 30, at 669 (warning that the long-
term commercial attraction of GLM is the enhancement of desirable traits); Elias & Annas,
supra note 31, at 148-49 (drawing attention to the social danger of eugenics in the form of
germ-line therapy); HUBBARD & WAm), supra note 4, at 116 (examining GLM's eugenic
implications); Pair Seeks to Patent 'Designer' Sperm Cells, Cmu. SuN-Tnvms, Apr. 8, 1994
(expressing concerns about the use of genetics to improve the human race).
67. Scholars often ethically distinguish between treatment of painful or seriously crip-
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cal and behavioral traits.6'
Because of the permanent nature of GLM and its potential cosmetic applica-
tion,69 GLM is illegal in several countries.7 0 Scholars predict that huge profit op-
portunities will propel biotechnology 7 companies to develop GLM further 2 and
pling conditions from those that cause impairment or inconvenience. Arthur L. Caplan, If
Gene Therapy Is the Cure, What Is the Disease?, in GEnuMAPING: UsrNGLA% ND ETmCS
As GumEis, supra note 3, at 136 (arguing that albinism is not a disease but an abnormality
that is "readily amenable to various interventions and coping strategies"). Many scholars
assert that the use of GLM to treat serious diseases is morally justifiable. Id at 140 (arguing
that GLM application to prevent fatal or serious diseases outweighs its potential harm);
Proctor, supra note 14, at 67 (arguing that disease does not enhance human diversity). Oth-
ers argue that parents' use of GLM to prevent less serious conditions in their children un-
justifiably diminishes the diversity in the human gene pooL M at 139-40 (articulating the
diversity argument made by several bioethicists); Wuaxm, supra note 46, at 160 (arguing
that the use of GUM to alter a "reasonably normal" trait is much more problematic than us-
ing it to treat a diseased embryo).
68. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 147 (explaining the fear that parents vwill use
GLM to enhance their children's physical and mental capabilities); BRODY, supra note 32, at
132 (addressing the possibility that parents may use GLM to impose their prejudices on their
descendants); Roger Ilghfield, A Afighty No to Designer Babies: Poll Paradox, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 16,1993, at 12 (discussing surveys addressing "designer babies", Cooke,
supra note 48, at 59 (discussing GLM's possible use to create stronger, smarter children).
69. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (explaining the effects of GLM on a
family's hereditary line and its potential use for enhancement purposes).
70. Bartha Iv. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, RecentAdvances in AfedicallyAssisted Con-
ception: LegaL Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AI. J.L. & MED. 329, 342 n.39 (1990) (pro-
viding an exhaustive list of countries currently banning GLM). For background on the
regulation of biotechnology applications outside the United States, se generally Nolle Le-
noir, International Symposium on Law and Science at the Crossroads: Biomedical Technol-
ogy, Ethics, Public Policy, and the Law: French, European, and International Legislation
on Bioethics, 27 SUrrOLK U. L. REv. 1249, 1249-60 (1993) (discussing French regulation of
biotechnology applications).
71. See BRoDy, supra note 32, at 133 (quoting NATIONAL hIsrTuTE oF GmmiAL
MEDIcAL ScruNws, TbE NEw Htr' GENaTros: How GmN SPLict HaE Ls REsE cHms
FIGr rThmaRrE DIsEAsEs 14, 20 (1986)). "Biotechnology" is the genetic alteration of cells
to induce the production of substances that are desirable or useful to human. Id. Biotech-
nology companies produce these innovations for commercial profit Powledge, supra note
22, at 15. This Comment defines a "biotechnology company" as a commercial producer of
gene therapy and/or genetic testing methods.
72. See, e.g., Marc Bossuyt, International Huran Pights Systems: Strengths and Weak-
nesses, in Humm RIGHTs i THE TWENTY-FIRST C gunv: A GLoaAL CHALLErxE 51
(Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Iahoney eds., 1993) (arguing that genetic technology will be
available because commercial interests "'all overcome human rights concerns); HuBBAD &
WAI), supra note 4, at 134 (projecting that genetic test sales in United States will hit sev-
eral hundred million dollars before the year 2000); Powledge, supra note 22, at 15 (ex-
plaining the commercial pressure on biotechnology developers to see doctors apply the new
techniques); Diane Paul, Is Human Genetics Disguised Eugenics?, in Gms xmr HM.w
Smx-KxowLGEo 67 (Robert F. Weir et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that genetic screening tech-
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that GLM will enjoy a large market when and where it becomes available. 73
GLM evokes controversy about the right of future generations to be free of ge-
netic alterations 74 made without their consent,75 particularly when alterations can
result in uncontrollable mutations in a family's gene pool. 76 In addition, GLM
raises the issue whether the genome itself has an intrinsic right to diversity.
77
The new level of scientific control that genetic testing and GLM offer may
popularize genetic determinism. 78 By making many genetic conditions seem
avoidable,79 genetic testing and GLM may encourage narrow, socially-determined
nology offers biotechnology companies huge entrepreneurial opportunities).
73. See, e.g., John P. Boyle, Response to Walters, in GENES AND HUMAN SELF-
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 72, at 243 (stating that surveys indicate that more people approve
of GLM use to correct genetic defects than disapprove of it); Paul, supra note 72, at 73
(quoting Neil Holtzman and Andrew Rothstein who argue that more women will request
prenatal tests because avoiding the birth of an at-risk child is often less expensive than clini-
cal treatment); Parens, supra note 25, at 3 (describing a 1992 Harris poll indicating that 43%
of Americans approve of using GLM to improve a baby's physical characteristics). But see
Highfield, supra note 68, at 12 (describing a 1993 poll indicating that 78% of people polled
oppose GLM for enhancement purposes).
74. See Margaret Somerville, Introduction to Section V(d): Reproduction, Technologies
and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 873 (raising the question whether future generations have
rights to an unmodified gene pool); Anderson, supra note 2, at 665 (asking whether children
have the right to unmanipulated genetic inheritance).
75. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 665 (questioning whether the doctrine of informed
consent applies to future people); Caplan, supra note 67, at 139 (articulating the argument
that it is wrong to impose the risks of GLM on descendants who cannot consent).
76. See HUBBARD & WAIL, supra note 4, at 114 (stating that diseases which result from
medical alterations to the germ-line are beyond the control of genetic surgeons).
77. Cf Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Environmental Rights: Taking the Environment Seri-
ously?, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 423, 440-41 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins
eds., 1996) (discussing the recognition of rights in natural objects based on their intrinsic
value rather than their usefulness to humans).
78. See Kutukdjian, supra note 41, at 23 (arguing that genetic research, which focuses
solely on explaining human behavior, will result in genetic determinism and stigmatization
based on genetic make-up); George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, The Major Policy Issues
Raised by the Human Genome Project, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS
GUIDES, supra note 3, at 13 [hereinafter Policy Issues] (asserting that the Human Genome
Project may cultivate a misperception that human decisions are the products of genetic
make-up or that people are manufactured goods subject to quality control). Genetic deter-
minism, also called genetic reductionism, is the exaggerated view that a large part of peo-
ple's talents and abilities are rooted in their genetic make-up. Evelyne Shuster, Determinism
and Reductionism: A Greater Threat Because of the Human Genome Project?, in GENE
MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES, supra note 3, at 115.
79. See Margrit Eichler, Human Rights and the New Reproductive Technologies: Indi-
vidual or Collective Choices?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 883 (arguing that reproductive technologies that
promise to "enhance" children may create discrimination by making disability seem pre-
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standards of "health" and "normality. "SO This viewpoint reinforces existing preju-
dices against individuals with disabilities or physical characteristics that do not live
up to a cultural ideal.81 Such standards can also generate social animosity toward
parents who allow their children to be born "defective" despite kmowledge of a
potential genetic condition.m As a result, the social focus, whether scientifically
realistic or not, shifts from encouraging tolerance of human diversity to developing
methods to avoid i03
I(B). THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEVORK
A. TRADITIONAL LANGUAGE
International human rights law evolved from several international instruments
that attempt to interprete 4 the United Nations Charter provision promoting "univer-
sal respect for, and observance ot human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
. ,,s These international instruments include: the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR),86 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
veritable).
80. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 31 (describing the stereotype that people
with genetic conditions should not be born); see also Policy Issues, supra note 78, at 14 (ar-
guing that diseases and abnormalities are social rather than biological creations); Ward, su-
pra note 2, at 63 (asserting that "health" is culturally and socially defined).
81. See Human Genetics Committee, supra note 30, at 671 (arguing that GLM vfll cre-
ate a technically-achievable health ideal based on social and political attitudes, rendering
people that fall short of it as "damaged goods"); Proctor, supra note 14, at 67 (stating that
Jeremy Rifkin, a vocal critic of genetic engineering, argues that gene therapy applications
will stigmatize culturally deviant individuals); HuBBARD & WAw, supra note 4, at 36 (ref-
erencing Troy Duster's view that "screening" implies something bad and that genetic
screening brands people as "defective" or "abnornal).
82. See Eichler, supra note 79, at 883 (quoting Theresa Degener, wiao argues that ge-
netic tests will preclude women from exculpating themselves for bearing children with ge-
netic defects by claiming lack of previous kmowledge).
83. See Ward, supra note 2, at 63 (arguing that genetic testing to screen out the disabled
may eclipse efforts to promote their social progress).
84. See John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History.
Impact and Juridical Character, in HutiAN RiaHrs: THnRTY YEARS AtmR TH
DECLARATION 21, 24, 34-37 (B. G. Ramcharan ed., 1979) (discussing several measures in
which the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council used the UDHR to interpret terms
of the U.N. Charter).
85. U.N. CHATER art. 55(c).
86. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(A), U.N. Doc. 810 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]. The United Nations Human Rights Commission drafted the UDHR as
a first attempt to catalogue and define civil, political, economic, and social rights. Hum-
phrey, supra note 84, at 24. The initial drafts of the UDHR originate in tents prepared by
western democratic nations. Id. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the UDHR unani-
mously in 1948. ALESsADRA LmnI DEL Russo, InTER ATIoNAL PRomcrtio:i oF Hm.i
AM. UJ. JNT L. & POL'Y
(ICCPR)8 7 and its Optional Protocol, 8 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Political Rightss9 (ICESCR).90 Together, they constitute what
scholars often refer to as the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR).9'
RIGHTS 36 (1971). When drafting the UDHR, the Commission did not intend it to carry
binding legal force. Id. There is however international consensus that the UDHR is now
binding on all U.N. members and arguably on all nations as customary international law.
Humphrey, supra note 84, at 29; BuERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 29-30.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, reprinted in 6 LL.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The U.N. Commission drafted the
ICCPR as the first of two treaties to bind states to the principles articulated in the UDHRI
DEL Russo, supra note 86, at 40. The ICCPR expands the number of civil and political
rights in the UDHR and defines them with greater specificity. BuEROENTHAL, supra note 16,
at 30. Although the ICCPR articulates some affirmative state responsibilities, human rights
scholars often characterize the ICCPR as a list of immediately-effective restraints on gov-
ernment action. Geraldine Van Bueren, Deconstructing the Mythologies of International
Human Rights Law, in UNDERsTA NrnG HuAN RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 599, The ICCPR
also creates a Human Rights Committee to review human rights reports submitted by each
state party and establish reporting guidelines that encourage state compliance with ICCPR
principles. BuERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 38. One hundred twenty-five states are parties
to the ICCPR, including the United States, which ratified the Covenant in 1992. BARRY E.
CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED Docuivmrrs 387 (1995)
[hereinafter CARTER & TUMSLE].
88. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, U.N. GA. Res. 2200 (XXI), reprinted in 6 LL.M. 383 (1967). The Optional Pro-
tocol allows individual victims of human rights violations to file complaints with the Human
Rights Committee against state parties. Bossuyt, supra note 72, at 49. The Committee re-
views the written communications of the complainant and the implicated state and commu-
nicates its findings to the parties and to the General Assembly in an annual report.
BU-RGENTHAL, supra, note 16, at 42. Committee decisions serve as tools to interpret and
implement the ICCPR. Id. As of December 31, 1993, there are 74 parties to the Optional
Protocol. CARTER & TRsLE, supra note 87, at 407. The United States is not a party to the
Protocol. Id.
89. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 LL.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The ICESCR expands in
detail the economic, social, and cultural rights contained in the UDHR, such as the right to
work, adequate standards of living, and education. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 42-43.
Unlike the ICCPR, scholars often characterize the state responsibilities in the ICESCR as
positive, requiring state intervention to provide goods and services. Van Bueren, supra note
87, at 599. But see id. (arguing that both the ICCPR and the ICESCR contain affirmative,
cost-generating duties on states). Consequently, the ICESCR serves as a blueprint for future
state action rather than a set of immediate constraints on state conduct. DEn Russo, supra
note 86, at 47. As of 1993, one hundred twenty-seven states are parties to the ICESCR.
CARTER & TPumLE, supra note 87, at 410. The United States has not ratified the Covenant
Id.
90. The U.N. General Assembly adopted all three instruments in 1966, and they entered
into effect in 1975 upon ratification by 35 states. CARTER & TRMMLE, supra note 87, at 387,
407,410.
91. Humphrey, supra note 84, at 22; BJERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 24.
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The instruments of the IBHR contain language that can support the develop-
ment and use of genetic testing and GLM0 The UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR re-
quire the protection of the family as society's basic unit?3 Both the UDHR and the
ICCPR forbid arbitrary interference with an individual's "privacy, family, [or]
home,"9 and guarantee the right of men and women "to found a family." 9 The
emphasis on personal privacy9 6 and individual choice that permeates this lan-
guage supports the argument for parental discretion to test and alter their prospec-
tive children.3 In addition, all three instruments affirm the right of parents to select
the form of their children's education? Parental liberty to monitor or control their
children's genetic make-up may logically derive from this right. cF3 Such an inter-
pretation would be consistent with the overall spirit of the IBHR, which seems to
exclude family decisions from the scope of human rights discussionYT '
92. See BRODY, supra note 32, at 24-29 (discussing the applicability of several human
rights instruments to health issues).
93. UDHR, supra note 86, art 16(3); ICCPR, supra note 87, art 23(1); ICESCR, supra
note 89, art 10(1).
94. UDHR, supra note 86, art. 12; ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 17.
95. UDHR, supra note 86, art. 16(1); ICCPR, supra note 87, art 23.
96. See Aart Hendricks & Manfred Nonak, Western European Case Study: 7he Impact
of Advanced Methods of Medical Treatment on Human Rights, in Ti IMpACT OF
TECHNOLOGY ON HUMAN RIGI-S: GLOBAL CASE STUDIES 243,248 (C. G. Weeramantry ed.,
1993) (explaining the emphasis on the right to privacy in the ICCPR); Walters, szTra note
24, at 657 (arguing that familial autonomy to use gene therapy to prevent disease would be a
natural extension of the freedom to seek genetic counseling); Billings Surveys, smpra note 2,
at 641-42 (arguing that the threat of losing insurance coverage pressures couples to abort
fetuses with certain genetic conditions, infringing on the couple's right to bear a child).
97. See DEL Russo, supra note 86, at 255 (concluding that individual rights are still the
focus of international human rights); Iles, supra note 4, at 51 (criticizing the emphasis on
the individual in the existing human rights framework). But see IL Gros Espiel, The Evolv-
ing Concept of Human Rights: Western, Socialist and 7ird World Approaches, in Hum .a
RiGim: TIrTy YEARs AFrER THE UNIvEsALDECLARAT oN, supra note 84, at 51 (arguing
thatthe period of 1947-1977 marked the end of individualist concepts of human rights).
98. See Recommendation 934 of the Council of Europe on Genetic Engincering, Eur.
Part Ass., 22nd Sess., Doe. Nos. 4832-33 (1982), reprinted in RooEms & nz Bousirmi,
supra note 14, app. at 304 [hereinafter Recommendation 934] (permitting parental consent
for experimentation on embryos or fetuses).
99. UDHR, supra note 86, art. 26, para. 3; ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 18, pare. 4;
ICESCR, supra note 89, art. 13, para. 3.
100. See Bob Wylie, Genes Pose Sequence of Di(ficult Questions, ScoTLrmu ON
SUNDAY, Feb. 27, 1994 (articulating the argument that if parents can give their children so-
cial advantages through private schooling, then they should be able to give them biological
advantages as well); Brian Appleyard, Our Plunge into the Gene Pool, k nmzmtr, May
12, 1993, at21 (articulating the argument of some moral philosophers that if parents can use
money "and other wiles" to improve their children, then they should also be able to use
biotechnology).
101. See Van Bueren, supra note 87, at 597 (explaining that family issues fall outside
the scope of traditional international human rights law, uiich only operates vithin the pub-
lic sphere).
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Both the UDHR and the ICESCR protect the individual's right to benefit from
scientific advancement.'0° In the genetic context, this right belongs to the unborn
child rather than its parents.10 3 An individual's right to life,'O° liberty,10 5 and "secu-
rity of person,"'1 6 as well as the economic, social, and cultural rights "indispensa-
ble for his dignity and the free development of his personality"''0 7 support the right
of the unborn child to benefit from genetic testing and GLM. Inherent in this lan-
guage is an emphasis on individual well-being that arguably presumes a right to be
free from the suffering that genetic technology can prevent'103
Ironically, this human rights language is equally relevant to the counter-
arguments1 ° 9 The counter-arguments shift the conceptual focus of the genetics de-
bate from individual rights of privacy and autonomy to collective rights of human-
ity." 0 From this perspective, the freedom to enjoy the benefits of scientific ad-
vancement requires a patient's consent, which is impossible when the patient is an
embryo.' The ICESCR provides protection against the "social exploitation" " 2 of
children, arguably prohibiting parents from using biotechnology to impose their
cultural preferences onto their descendants." 3 In addition, critics of genetic tech-
nology argue that insurance companies may violate their right to found a family by
denying them insurance for knowingly giving birth to children with genetic condi-
102. UDHR, supra note 86, art. 27, par. 2; ICESCR, supra note 89, art. 15, para. l(b).
In particular, the ICESCR recognizes "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health." ICESCR, supra, art 12, para. 1. It calls
upon states to take steps to prevent and treat diseases, Id. art. 12, pare. 2(c), ensure "the
healthy development of the child," Id. art. 12, para. 2(a), achieve the "development and the
diffusion of science" and preserve the "freedom indispensable for scientific research." Id.
art. 15, paras. 2-3.
103. See Iles, supra note 4, at 36 (asserting that the right to benefit from scientific ad-
vancement arguably protects individuals from the potential dangers of the Human Genome
Project).
104. UDHR, supra note 86, art 3 (protecting an individual's right to life); ICCPR, su-
pra note 87, art. 6, para. 1 (protecting individual's right to life).
105. Id. art. 3 (protecting individual liberty); ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 9, pare. 1
(protecting individual liberty).
106. UDHR, supra note 86, at art.3; ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 9.
107. UDHR, supra note 86, art. 22.
108. See Somerville, supra note 74, at 873 (asking if failure to use technological ad-
vances to relieve pain is equivalent to torture).
109. Cf James Kingston, Human Rights: The Solution to the Abortion Question?, in
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 77, at 467-68 (asserting that both pro-choice
and pro-life activists can use human rights arguments to support their positions).
110. See BRODY, supra note 32, at 6 (arguing that health care issues ofiten require indi-
vidual autonomy to yield to greater community interests).
111. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 274 (indicating the difficulty of apply-
ing the informed consent requirement to unborn children).
112. ICESCR, supra note 89, art. 10, para. (3).
113. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 272 (criticizing the use of genetic tech-
nology to impose current aesthetic ideals on future generations).
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tions."
4
This viewpoint conceptualizes the family not as a group of presently living in-
dividuals, but as a line of descendants that share equal rights through time."'
The inviolability of the family functions as a prohibition on any actions that would
subject descendants to forced alterations or unexpected mutations." 6 The right to
life, entailing a respect for diverse genetic expression and bodily integrity, is a pre-
requisite to the full development of the human personality and dignity!1 7 The right
of individuals to "enjoy ... fully and freely their natural wealth and resources,"" 8
guaranteed in the ICCPR and ICESCR, translates into a human genome that, as a
natural resource, should be free of excessive human control.' 9
The ICCPR specifically guarantees that "no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to ... scientific experimentation."120 Critics of GLM argue that even if
scientists develop reliable insertion techniques,' 21 GLM may generate unexpected
and irreversible mutations in the patient's offspring.12 By knowingly imposing
these risks on an embryo, scientists can subject future people to scientific experi-
mentation without their consent's 3
The majority of international human rights instruments currently do not address
whether the right to life applies to the unborn. 24 They do, however, protect spa-
114. See Billings Surveys, supra note 2, at 641-42 (arguing that the threat of losing in-
surance coverage pressures parents to abort a fetus with a genetic condition, possibly in-
fringing their right to bear children).
115. See BRODy, supra note 32, at 36 (asserting that the reproductive rights of parents
must balance those of their descendants in a continuum).
116. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that GLM may cause unex-
pected genetic mutations in descendants).
117. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 272 (arguing that the use of GLM for
enhancement purposes violates the right of the unborn child to be treated With dignity).
118. ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 89, art. 25.
119. See Hendricks & Noak, supra note 96, at 268 (expressing concern over man's
enlarged control over humanity through genetic research).
120. ICCPR, supra note 87, art 7.
121. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining the technical problems of
gene insertion).
122. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of scientific movl-
edge about how genes interact with each other and their environment).
123. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 114-15 (stressing scientists' deficient un-
derstanding of gene fiuctions and interactions); Human Genetics Committee, supra note 30,
at 668 (stating that scientists cannot predict the full effects of gene modification).
124. Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abof'on Under the Draft Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 12 Hurm. RTs. Q. 156 (1990). An exception is the American Convention
on Human Rights, which states that the right to life shall be protected 'from the moment of
conception." Id at 156-57. Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 268 (stating that interna-
tional law has not defined rights of posterity). The international community has addressed
the rights of the unborn only within the abortion debate vhere there is a general consensus
that international human rights protection does not extend to the unborn. See Alston, supra,
at 161 (stating that drafters repeatedly rejected attempts to recognize a right to life for the
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cific, enumerated groups from discrimination based on their group identity.'2 Al-
though the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR recognize that group affiliations based on
"other status" deserve protection,126 none specifically address the legal status of
victims of genetic discrimination.
127
Since the promulgation of the International Bill of Rights, other United Nations
declarations have recognized the potential dangers that scientific advancement
poses to human rights.'2 These instruments provide states with little guidance for
regulation because they do not specifically address the situations in which dis-
unborn). Draft proposals to the ICCPR providing that human life begins at conception were
ultimately excluded from the right to life provision in Article 6. Kingston, supra note 109, at
458. The European Commission concluded in Paton v. UK that the right to life provision in
Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funaunental
Freedoms did not protect the unborn. Id. at 459. Finally, several attempts to grant the fetus
legal status failed during the drafting stages of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
primarily because the Working Group of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, charged with
the drafting of the Convention, wanted to allow state parties latitude to formulate their own
policy on the abortion issue. Alston, supra, at 163. Although the third preambular paragraph
of the Convention recognizes that children require special legal protection "before as well as
after birth," the international legal community considers this a policy statement carrying no
binding force, particularly because it is not reafirmed within the body of the Convention.
Alston, supra, at 167, 169, 177.
125. The UDHR and the ICCPR both state that "[a]ll are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law." UDHR, supra note
86, art. 7; ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 26. Along with the ICESCR, they prohibit discrimina-
tion based on "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status." UDHR, supra note 86, art. 2; ICCPR, supra
note 87, art. 26; ICESCR, supra note 89, art. 2, para. 2.
126. UDHR, supra note 86, art. 2; ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 26; ICESCR, supra note
89, art. 2, para. 2.
127. UDHR, supra note 86, art. 2; ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 26; ICESCR, supra note
89, art 2, para. 2.
128. The Tehran Declaration of 1968, issued by the International Conference on Human
Rights, calls for "continuing attention" to the potential negative implications of scientific
projects for human rights. Final Act of the Int'l Conf. on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 Apr.-
13 May, 1968, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.32/41 [hereinafter Teheran Declaration]. The
Conference later passed a resolution recommending analysis of the "protection of the human
personality and its physical and intellectual integrity." Id., Res. 11, at 12. In 1975, the
United Nations issued the Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress
in the Interests of Peace and For the Benefit of Mankind, G.A. Res. 3384, U.N. GAOR, 30th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res./3384 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Declaration], which recognizes the
possible dangers of scientific advancement in more detail. Id. at 1. The Conference
Resolution and the 1975 Declaration notably recognize the importance of group rights to the
biotechnology discussion, unlike the IBHR, which emphasizes individual rights. Id. at 3
(recognizing that genetic research may "infringe on the rights ... of the group"); Teheran
Declaration, supra, Res. 11, at 12 (acknowledging that scientific advancement "may entail
certain dangers for.., the group and for human dignity").
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crimination may arise.1 9 Moreover, they do not define or reject a legal status for
people with genetic conditions and their unborn children. 30
The language that human rights movements traditionally employ does not func-
tion well within a biotechnology framework131 Traditional human rights law was
based on the assertion of individual rights against the state.132 Genetic technology
upsets this presumption by pitting the rights of existing individuals against those of
future individuals. 33 By adding new players to the human rights game,'3 genetic
technology defies the concepts underlying the existing model and reveals the need
for a revised language.
35
B. TRADrrONAL CONCEPTS
Most human rights scenarios typecast the state135 as the human rights viola-
tor.137 They portray governments as awesome, centralized monsters that actively
129. Accord les, supra note 4, at 38 (describing the 1975 Declaration as isolated and
undeveloped).
130. 1975 Declaration, supra note 128, at 3.
131. Cf Kingston, supra note 109, at 467-68 (arguing that because either pro-choice or
anti-abortion activists may invoke human rights arguments, the existing human rights
framework is not helpful to the abortion debate).
132. See ADREw CLAPHAM, H mAN RIGHTs rN THE PRivAm SPmlE 91 (1993) (argu-
ing that individuals traditionally viewed their rights as protected against state action), Irwin
Cotler, Human Rights as the Modem Tool ofRevolution, in HU.AN RiGHTS IN THE Twezy'-
FIRST CEmTUY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at I I (explaining that the individual
is the subject of post-World War II human rights law). For further background on individu-
alism as a basis of international human rights law, compare DEL Russo, supra note 86, at
255 (arguing that individuals are still the focus of human rights), and lies, supra note 4 at
51-52 (arguing that the existing human rights framework has a bias tovurds individualisl),
mith Espiell, supra note 97, at 43-51 (arguing that the individualist concept of human rights
vwas obsolete by 1948).
133. See BRODY, supra note 32, at 36 (arguing that individuals may limit the rights of
their progeny by fully exercising their own rights).
134. See Hendricks & Novmk, supra note 96, at 266 (stating that genetic technology
implicates the rights of posterity).
135. See Eichler, supra note 79, at 887 (advocating an expanded hunan rights approach
that addresses global as well as individual interests).
136. Although the words "state" and "government" have distinct definitions in interna-
tional law, this Comment uses them interchangeably to refer to the governing authority of
each nation.
137. See, e.g., Nani Palkhivala, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Hm.laz
R Ts minE TwaurY-FmsT CENURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 442 (ex-
plaining that the focus of human rights is the assertion of rights against the government);
Bossuyt, supra note 72, at 50 (arguing that states are the primary human rights violators),
Cotler, supra note 132, at 12 (listing nine recommendations for the human rights movement,
five of vhAich are directed at states); lies, supra note 4, at 52 (arguing that traditional hber-
alism calls upon people to enforce their rights against the state). But see Johannes Morsink,
The Philosophy of the Universal Declaration, 6 Hum. RTs. Q. 309, 333 (arguing that human
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abuse their people. 3s Because of the state's leading role, traditional scenarios limit
human rights issues to the public sphere, where individuals clash with state
agents.139 As a result, claims of abuse by private actors fall outside the scope of the
human rights framework.
140
Conventional analyses also depict the human rights victim as a living member
of a defined group, one that is easily circumscribed by a mental boundary.' 4' In
most cases, the members of this group are distinguishable by physical features such
as race or gender, or by natural affiliation with an ethnic, national, linguistic or re-
ligious group.
142
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
clearly illustrates this "contained" image of the human rights victim. 43 The Con-
vention defines genocide as an act performed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group" 44 by any of the following means:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
rights in the UDHR are based on natural rights that transcend the state).
138. See Van Bueren, supra note 87, at 598 (explaining that traditional interpretations
of human rights focus on a state's power to subject its people); DEL Russo, supra note 86, at
62 (stressing the role of the state as the perpetrator of genocide).
139. CLAPHAM, supra note 132, at 91 n.10 (articulating the traditional assumption that
only states carry human rights responsibilities).
140. See id. at 126 (stating that traditional human rights law excludes actions of private
actors); Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of States,
13 FoRDHAM T.NT'L L.J. 1, 20 (1990) (stating that international human rights standards gen-
erally do not apply to acts of private persons).
141. See Richard Falk, Preface to EDrrH B. WEISS, IN FAmNsSS TO Fururn
GENERATIONS: .NTmRNATIONAL LAW, CoMMoN PATRIMONY, AND INTEROENERATIONAL
EQUITy, at xxi-ii (1989) (explaining that in traditional international law, problems ofjustice
involve people living on "distinct territorial units" surrounded by "discernible boundaries").
142. See Malcolm N. Shaw, The Definition of Minorities in International Law, 1990
ISRAEL Y.B. HuM. RTS. 13, 29 (stating that some scholars distinguish between race as a he-
reditary physical characteristic and ethnicity as a cultural, linguistic and religious character-
istic); Asbjorn Eide, Minority Protection and World Order: Towards a Framework for Law
and Policy, in UNIVERSAL MINORITY RIGHTs 87, 88 (Alan Phillips & Allan Rosas eds.,
1995) (explaining the traditional assumption that minority groups exist naturally and im-
mutably).
143. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in CAmR & TRuMBLE, supra note 87, at 419 [herein-
after Genocide Convention]; see also Eide, supra note 142, at 106-07 (discussing measures
to accommodate minority groups based on their territorial location).
144. Genocide Convention, supra note 143, art I.
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of one group to another group.'
45
The Convention limits eligibility for group status to race-which is physically
distinguishable-and nationality, ethnicity and religion--which arrange individu-
als into easily recognizable categories.146 The condemnation of killing, bodily
harm, and physical destruction implies that the human rights victim is necessarily a
living being whose physical integrity must exist in order to be threatened.
147
In this manner, the traditional human rights framework paints both the victim
and the state as discrete and cohesive. 4s Moreover, it forces human rights organi-
zations to act as reactionary bodies. 49 Because violation requires action by the
state, human rights groups can address violations only after they occur."5 Conse-
quently, the role of human rights organizations is limited to treatment rather than
prevention.' 5 '
II. ANALYSIS: FORMING NEW DEFINITIONS
A. SOCIETY AS VIOLATOR
1. Privatization of Power
Biotechnology challenges the human rights status quo by usurping the state's
power to violate and by placing that power in the hands of private actors through-
out society.152 Doctors, attracted by the opportunity to lower their liability insur-
ance, may offer these innovations to their patients. 1' Insurance companies and
145. Id.
146. Id. (protecting national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups); see also Eide, sipra
note 142, at 90 (quoting scholar Clifford Geertz, mrao argues that collective identity emerges
from "immediate contiguity," kinship and birth into particular religious or linguistic com-
munity).
147. Id. art H (a)-(c) (discussing killing, bodily harm, and physical destuction, see
also DEL Russo, supra note 86, at 59 (comparing genocide to homicide
148. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (describing both the state and hu-
man rights victims as insular); BuERrENTHAL, supra note 16, at 8-9 (discussing international
protection of "pockets" of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities under the League of
Nations system).
149. See Cotler, supra note 132, at 19 (stating that non-governmental organizations ad-
dressing human rights issues have traditionally been "crisis-oriented").
150. Id
151. Id. (stating that crisis management is the traditional objective of human rights
nongovernmental organizations).
152. See Iles, supra note 4, at 33-34 (arguing that regulation of genetic technology
should focus on the actions of doctors, scientists, employers, insurers, biomedical corpora-
tions, and clinics).
153. See HuBBARD & WALE, supra note 4, at 27 (arguing that doctors ,ill recommend
tests to their patients to avoid malpractice suits, even vhen there is no discernible health
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employers may implement these innovations to stream-line their operations.'54 Pa-
tients, pressured to discover their own health potential and that of their children,
may demand them as well.
1 55
Biotech corporations, sensing a huge pot of gold at the end of a research and
development rainbow,' 56 will aggressively market genetic technology to meet this
demand.' 57 Because of its specialized nature,'58 widespread availability of biotech-
nology may transform biotech companies into mini-technocracies that can influ-
ence the personal decisions of broad'sectors of society, usurping power tradition-
ally in the hands of the state15 9 If the application of biotechnology breeds
discrimination or causes harmful mutations in future generations, state responsibil-
ity will arise from authorizing the violations rather than authoring them. 6°
Ultimately, human rights abuses resulting from scientific advancement will
originate in the private sphere of society, rather than the public sphere of govern-
ment. This privatization of human rights abuses will occur as part of a growing
trend of privatization of services.' 6' Whereas people once viewed the state as the
only source of authority,1 62 they now view themselves as "subjects" of private po-
problem); Paul, supra note 72, at 76-77 (arguing that genetic screening will provide doctors
with protection against malpractice suits).
154. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (explaining how genetic screening
can reduce operating costs for employers and insurance companies).
155. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 283-84 (arguing that an individual's
stake in test results increases as more non-medical actors begin to require testing); see also
Paul, supra note 72, at 77 (predicting that increased use of genetic tests will make parents
feel as if they have no reasonable alternative to testing or aborting their fetus); supra note 73
and accompanying text (projecting high public demand for genetic technology).
156. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 35 (quoting physicians Benjamin Wilfond
and Norman Frost, who argue that biotechnology companies will "reap enormous profits"
from genetic test sales); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the large
profit opportunities for biotechnology companies).
157. See HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 35-36 (arguing that biotechnology pro-
ducers will go to great lengths to market their products, particularly since they are expensive
to produce).
158. See Wnrmn, supra note 46, at 162 (discussing the high level of technical expertise
that genetic surgeons must have).
159. See id. at 162 (arguing that a "small elite technocracy" of genetic surgeons will
have technical control over the future of human genetic resources); see also Iles, supra note
4, at 34 (recommending regulation to prevent biomedical companies and clinics from rec-
ommending certain genetic tests).
160. See Shelton, supra note 140, at 21-24 (1990) (arguing that international law re-
quires states to exercise due diligence to prevent human rights violations by private actors);
see also CLAPHAM, supra note 132, at 91-92 (asserting that states may be responsible for
private violations that they do not address in legislation).
161. See Van Bueren, supra note 87, at 596-97 (discussing the continuing privatization
of institutions and personnel); CLAPHAM supra note 132, at 126 (stating that privatization of
services is the current trend in Europe).
162. CLAPHAM supra note 132, at 126.
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lice, hospitals, corporations, and religious institutions.1 As a result, the privatiza-
tion of human rights will obscure the boundaries of the public and private
spheres.16 Where private actors develop authority similar to a state,'65 they will
qualify for scrutiny under international human rights standards.1fs
Although regional international human rights courts have recognized the re-
sponsibility of private actors,167 the international community has not acted upon
this idea in pmctice.1 s At any rate, privatization makes clear that the sources of
human rights abuse will outgrow their legal infrastructure.' 69 This prompts many
scholars to argue for a redefinition of human rights that includes accountability of
private actors who assume a quasi-public role.
170
163. Id. (suggesting that such institutions are not typically considered "organs" of the
state).
164. Van Bueren, supm note 87, at 597.
165. It is interesting that several scholars use political languge to describe the conduct
of private commercial actors. See, e.g., Ursula Franklin, New Threats to Human Rights
Through Science and Technology-The Need for Standards, in H mN RIGHTs IN THE
TwEmNY-FiRsT CEmr-my: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 733-34 (contending that
scientific advances have "increased the machinery of dominance and oppression" and may
create a "headless tyranny"); HuBBARD & WAIL, supra note 4, at 116 (referring to geneti-
cists as "self-appointed arbiters of human excellence"); WmXE, supra note 46, at 162 (refer-
ring to genetic surgeons as a "small, elite technocracy"); Paul, supra note 72, at 77 (refer-
ring to the private health care industry as "quasi-public").
166. CLAPHA , supra note 132, at 126 (arguing that quasi-public actors should have to
adhere to international human rights law as well as national statutory law); Nigel S. Rodley,
Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?, in H.AN Ri arrs nmm Twmrm-
FmsT CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 300 (redefining human rights law
to include relationships betveen individuals and entities exercising state-like power).
167. See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. C.H1L OAS/sex. I/V/IL19,
doe. 13 (1988) (holding that states must prevent human rights violations by public authori-
ties and private actors assuming an anthoritative role); X & Y v. Netherl&nds 91 Eur. Ct
R. (ser. A) (1985) (suggesting that state responsibility extends to interactions betveen
private individuals).
168. Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney, Introduction Section HI(b): Non-State
Actors and Violence, in HmAN RIGrs iN rH T1 rrY-Fs CE'nmy: A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 295.
169. See CI.APHAi, supra note 132, at 126 (arguing that human rights violations by
quasi-public actors fall outside the scope of traditional human rights law).
170. See, e.g., Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 168, at 295 (arguing that human rights
law must extend to private actors in practice); UNESCO Secretariat, UNESCO and the
Challenges of Today and Tomorrow: Universal Affirmation of Human Rights, in HU.IAN
RiGms: THmRTY YEARs AFra nm UNnErAL DECLARATnON, supra note 84, at 208 (advo-
cating the use of human rights concepts to combat violations by corporations and other pri-
vate actors); CLAPHAi, supra note 132, at 126 (arguing that a new definition of the public
sphere must incorporate private actors and actions); Van Bueren, supra note 37, at 601 (ar-
guing for complete extension of international human rights law into the private sphere, lies,
supra note 4, at 35 (promoting a human rights framework that confronts abuses by private
social institutions); Shelton, supra note 140, at 34 (recommending the ratification of ACHR
to require the United States to exercise due diligence to prevent human rights violations by
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2. Diffusion of Power
The expanding role of private actors in human rights analyses also reveals a dif-
fusion of power from a centralized state to individuals dispersed throughout soci-
ety. 171 Strong public demand and aggressive commercial supply can transform the
nature of eugenics from a state-managed program to a grass-roots movement172
Ursula Franklin, a Professor Emeritus at the University of Toronto, argues that
technology produces a power diffusion by masking principled decisions in non-
human structures. 173 These structures ultimately control larger numbers of people
by more invisible means.'7 4 Thus, by requiring genetic tests to generate a pool of
desirable or fit people, employers, insurers, and other institutional actors can dis-
guise new versions of eugenics in application forms and clinical files.' 75 By per-
private actors); cf Alan W. Scheflin, The Use of Medicine and Psychiatry to Commit Hu-
man Rights Violations: The Mind Control Experiments, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN Tm TwENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 843 (argues for recognition of
mind control practices by state andprivate actors as human rights abuse). Some scholars do
not specifically address privatization in their writings but devote equal attention to public
and private actors as sources of human rights violations. See id. at 832-39 (addressing the
use of mind control by state and private actors as a human rights violation); Hendricks &
Nowak, supra note 96, at 281-86 (addressing the use of genetic technology by both state and
private actors).
171. See HtuBnARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 160-62 (arguing that laws must restrain
the broad power that genetic technology confers upon geneticists, physicians, and society in
general); HENDRiCKS AND NowAK, supra note 96, at 272 (criticizing the aesthetic discretion
that GLM gives parents).
172. See Paul, supra note 72, at 70 (observing the rise of a "new eugenics" rooted in a
multitude of individual decisions to undergo genetic testing and therapy); JONATHAN
MARms, HUMAN BioDiv'RsrrY: GENEs, RACE AND HIsToRY 150 (1995) (identifying the
family as the source of contemporary eugenics); McKusick, supra note 4, at 633 (arguing
that prenatal diagnosis requirements by insurance companies would result in defacto
eugenics); fles, supra note 4, at 54 (arguing that individual decisions may produce a eugenic
effect when aggregated); Groves, supra note 9, at BI (referring to parents' use of GLM to
enhance their children's physical characteristics as "commercial eugenics"); see also High-
field, supra note 68, at 12 (quoting Professor Steve Jones of the University College London,
who observes that the public is more open to GLM use than policymakers).
173. Franklin, supra note 165, at 734-35. To illustrate this point, Franklin contrasts a
security guard with a magnetic card reader. While people may question the authority of a
guard who prevents them from entering a building, they are much less likely to question a
card-reader that controls the lock on the door. Id. This example represents a trend in human
behavior to question the fruits of government but not those of science. See Somerville, supra
note 74, at 871 (explaining the traditional assumption that medicine is motivated by altruism
and therefore cannot be a source of human rights violations).
174. Franklin, supra note 165, at 734-35. Revisiting her example, Franklin notes that
after people enter the building and pass the guard, they are free from "human control." Yet
other card-readers may track and document where and when they move about the building.
Id.
175. See McKusick, supra note 4, at 633 (arguing that insurance policies that require
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forming GLM on individual embryos or sex cells, physicians can produce snow-
balling genetic alterations that may subject entire families to harmful mutations or
societal prejudice.
17 6
To address this problem, Franklin proposes a conceptual famework for human
rights encompassing both micro-situations, which affect small, discrete groups of
people, and macro-situations, which affect large segments of society.1 77 She con-
cludes that the current human rights regime can only address micro-situations and
must be rebuilt to confront macro-situations as well.178 Franklin's conceptual
framework is particularly useful in the genetics context because it acknowledges
that governments need a broadened definition of "violation" in order to regulate
the potential "headless tyranny" of science.17 9
B. HUM NIT AS VICTmI
Privatization of abusive power alters the nature of the human rights victim.o
When the power to violate human rights diffuses throughout society through test-
ing and therapy applications, the effects of abuse become large-scale. 18 1 Discrimi-
nation transcends racial, ethnic, or other conventional classifications to affect large
cross-sections of society.1' 2 Moreover, by extending this discrimination to future
generations, GLM and embryo diagnosis add a temporal dimension to human
rights infringement.18 3 Given this potential for violations-of-scale, the conventional
image of the discrete human rights victim becomes inadequate.184 Technological
prenatal diagnosis would, in effect, create eugenics programs).
176. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (discussing the potential biological
and social consequences of GIM).
177. Franklin, supra note 165, at 736. Franklin offers torture and kidnapping as exam-
ples of micro-violations and chemical and nuclear a-fare as examples of macro-violations.
Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 735.
180. See Somerville, supra note 74, at 873-74 (arguing that human rights breaches in
health care create societal harms).
181. See Edward W. Ploman, Foreword to EDrrnH B. WFass, IN FA~nmss TO FtrrumE
GENERATioNs: NTrERNATIoNAL LAW, Co.%oN PATRMIMONY, AND I Er 0 .ERATIONAL
EQurY at xxvi (1989) (recognizing that technology allows people unprecedented control
over their environment, producing a wide spatial effect); Proctor, supra note 14, at 70 (ar-
guing that the effects of gene therapy and genetic testing will be populational, Paul, sumpra
note 72, at 70 (arguing that the decisions of private individuals can have populational ef-
fects).
182. Ploman, supra note 181, at xxvi (arguing that technology gives people broad
power that trascends territorial boundaries).
183. Id. at xxvi; K Nolan & S. Swenson, New Tools, New Dilemmas: Genetic Fron-
tiers, HASTIGS Cm REP., Oct/Nov. 1988, at 42 (predicting "reneved commitment to
intergenerational relatedness").
184. See Eichler, supra note 79, at 887 (arguing that the effects of new reproductive
technologies are not limited to small groups of people and supporting the expansion of hu-
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innovations that cross social and generational boundaries' 85 enlarge the victim pool
from specific groups of humans to humanity in general. 186 Thus, the paradigm of
human rights analysis shifts from the individual incident to the ongoing condi-
tion.
187
The juxtaposition of spatial and temporal forces defies conventional definitions
of many human rights violations.38  This particularly applies to genocide, which
relies conceptually on state aggression, conspicuous conduct, and a demarcated
group victim.189 Biotechnology provides a new image of victimhood which invites
exploration into the definitional frontiers of genocide.
1. Gene-ocide
Broad application of GLM or embryo diagnosis for selective pregnancy is ar-
guably comparable to genocide, as defined by the Genocide Convention." ° Appli-
cations involve intentional acts by parents, doctors or commercial actors to destroy
all or part of groups sharing certain genetic traits.19' Scientists design these tech-
niques in a calculated attempt to destroy the physical integrity of these groups, im-
plicating Article II(c) of the Convention.'92 Health care professionals implement
these techniques in order to prevent births within genetic groups, implicating Arti-
cle II(d).' 93 These similarities raise the question whether the definition of genocide
can or should include social repression of genetic traits. Does genocide apply to
expressions of life as well as life itself? Or is biotechnology fostering a separate
crime of gene-ocide?
man rights analysis to encompass issues with global repercussions).
185. But see Iles, supra note 4, at 46 (arguing that genetic discrimination reinforces tra-
ditional social divisions).
186. See Ploman, supra note 181, at xxvii (arguing that all of humanity holds
intergenerational rights); Lenoir, supra note 70, at 1255 (condemning cosmetic gene therapy
as a threat to the integrity of the human species).
187. See BRODY, supra note 32, at 36 (asserting that reproductive rights operate in a
continuum that mediates the freedoms of existing and future generations).
188. See Ploman, supra note 181, at xxvi (explaining the complimentary nature of spa-
tial and temporal factors in international law).
189. See DEL Russo, supra note 86, at 62 (arguing that a plan by the United States gov-
ernment to destroy all or part of the black race would be genocide, but that private lynchings
would not); see also supra note 145 and accompanying text (providing the conventional
definition of genocide).
190. Genocide Convention, supra note 143, art. 11.
191. Id. (requiring intent to destroy a group).
192. Id. art. 11(c) (prohibiting actions calculated to bring about the physical destruction
of all or part of a group).
193. Id. art. 1(d) (prohibiting "measures intended to prevent births within the group").
However, these arguments assume that people prone to "undesirable" genetic conditions are
worthy of group status. The Genocide Convention applies only to racial, national, ethnic,
and religious groups. Id. art. IH.
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Several scholars propose broadened definitions of genocide.'9 Sociologist
Helen Fein offers a definition particularly well-suited to the genetics debate. Fein
defines genocide as: "sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically de-
stroy a collectivity, directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and
social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack
of threat offered by the victim." 195
Fein's definition recognizes that the calculated conduct of social institutions and
private individuals can create discrimination against groups of people wthout ma-
licious intent 195 Thus, even if scientists develop GLM strictly to combat disease,19
they may still be culpable if they know that people will use GLM to eliminate so-
cially undesirable traits.ma Fein's definition does not typecast the state as the hu-
194. Frank Chalk, Redefining Genocide, in Gmz:oc Co acpruAL A=D HISTO.IcAL
DnmrsIos at 47 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994). For example, Pieter Drost argues
that the Genocide Convention definition should prohibit the intentional destruction of the
physical life of individuals based on their membership in any human collectivity. Id at 48.
While this definition recognizes that discrimination can arise against groups not enumerated
in the Convention, it fails to specify whether destruction of physical life encompasses al-
teration of life in its prenatal form. Id. Irving Louis Horowitz proposes that the Convention
recognize genocide as state-sponsored destruction of innocent people using structural and
systemic means. See Chalk, supra, at 48-49. This definition acknowledges that technology
can violate human rights through structure and function rather than decree. Id. at 49. Yet it
does not apply to biotechnology issues because it assumes the state's active role in the vio-
lation. Id. Isidor Walliman and Michael Dobkowski build on Horowitz's definition by ar-
guing that a definition of genocide that requires intent ignores violations that are so .Ade-
spread and systemic that both the perpetrators and the victims are unaware of them. Id.
Isidor Wallimann & Michael N. Dobkowvski, Introduction to Gm=ocIME AIM Tm MoDnM
AGE: ETIOLOGY A CAsE STUrIEs oF MAsS DEAnT xvi (Isidor Wallimann & Michael N.
Dobkowski eds., 1987). This definition, like that of Horowvitz, is relevant to the genetics de-
bate because it acknowledges that human rights violations can be rooted in societal forces.
Id. Yet it mistakenly equates intentionality with malicious acts rather than deliberate acts.
Helen Fein, Genocide, Terror, Life Integrit, and War Crimes: The CaseforDiscrimination,
in GEiocIE: CONCEPTUAL AND HIsTORicAL DsamioNs, supra, at 95, 97 (dafining intent
as 'purposeful action! rather than motive); Roger W. Smith, Human Destnctiveness and
Politics: The Twentieth Century as an Age of Genocide, in GmwczmB iaZ THE MoDM
AGE: ETiOLOGY AND CASE STUDmS oF rS DEATH, supra, at 21, 23 (asserting that an act is
intentional when the actor persists in the action despite knowledge of its consequences).
195. Chalk, supra note 194, at 49.
196. See Fein, supra note 194, at 97 (arguing that purposeful action, not motive, fulfills
the intent requirement of genocide); Chalk, supra note 194, at 53 (discussing the concept of
a "genocidal society," where a state and its citizens exhibit the intent element of genocide by
continually pursuing policies that they know will result in the destruction of an indigenous
group).
197. Ward, supra note 2, at 63 (stating that researchers are developing gene therapy to
treat illnesses such as heart disease, diabetes, AIDS, and susceptibility to cancer). But see
Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 149 (arguing that the distinction betveen disease and en-
hancement is "inherently fuzzy" and that it may be impossible to prevent cosmetic uses of
GLM once the technique is available).
198. Likevse, surgeons vAo alter a genetic defect in an individual embryo do not in-
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man rights violator, but refers more generally to a perpetrator.199 Moreover, by fo-
cusing generally on the collectivity, Fein's definition acknowledges that groups
face discrimination based on factors other than race, religion, nationality, or eth-
nicity. 20° Finally, by addressing reproductive intervention and the vulnerability of
the victim, the definition confronts the ethical problems of gene manipulation
without the informed consent of the patient
2 0 1
Frank Chalk argues that expanding the definition of genocide to include struc-
tural mechanisms or private acts would debase government conduct that threatens
the existence of whole peoples.2 2 Chalk bases his argument on two faulty assump-
tions, however. First, he assumes that only states act in ways that threaten large
populations. 0 3 Institutional practices often inflict more harm by disguising human
rights violations in standard operating procedures. 04 Social admiration of science
and skepticism of government reinforces this invisibility.205 Furthermore, because
individuals interact with employers, schools, and insurance companies on a daily
basis, social institutions can cause them more direct harm than a distant govern-
ment.
2 o
Chalk also assumes that expanding the definition of genocide beyond the scope
of state activity will trivialize state-sponsored atrocities.20 7 In doing so, he imposes
tend to eradicate the defect from the entire human species. Ward, supra note 2, at 63. Yet
genetic surgeons know that their individual actions, when aggregated, form broad medical
practices that may reduce genetic diversity. Id.
199. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional role of
the state as human rights violator).
200. See Genocide Convention, supra note 143, art. II (limiting the scope of genocide
to "national, ethnical, racial or religious groups").
201. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the ethical implications
of GLM for future generations).
202. Chalk, supra note 194, at 56-57. Chalk criticizes the emphasis on structural
sources of violation, arguing that people, not systems, kill. Id. He insists that genocide must
be perpetrated by an agent of the state because only the state has the power to stop genocide.
Id. at 59. But see Rodley, supra note 166, at 310 (stating that because genocide involves
large-scale assault on a population, it may be an exception to the state nexus requirement for
private-actor liability).
203. Chalk, supra note 194, at 59 (asserting that the role of the state as the perpetrator
of genocide distinguishes genocide from homicide).
204. See Frandin, supra note 165, at 734-35 (illustrating the imperceptible nature of
discriminatory policies that are implemented by technological innovations).
205. See Somerville, supra note 74, at 871 (criticizing the assumption that medicine is
always motivated by altruism).
206. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the use of genetic tests by
schools to establish students' scholastic aptitude); CLAPHAM, supra note 132, at 137 (de-
scribing the emergence of state-like authority in social institutions such as associations, cor-
porations, and interest groups).
207. Chalk, supra note 194, at 57. To illustrate this point, Chalk distinguishes the Nazi
Holocaust as a unique example of genocide in part because it involved intent to destroy a
biologically-defined group. Id. at 58. Biotech companies arguably develop tests and therapy
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a moral hierarchy onto a definitional debate.203 International organizations must
form a definition for genocide (or any crime, for that matter) based on criteria and
apply the definition to all acts that satisfy them.2 m Although moral considerations
help establish criteria, they alone do not determine whether a definition applies.210
Despite broadened definitions, genetic expression does not conform well to the
physical aspects of genocide. Although the language of Article II(c) and (d) of the
Genocide Convention arguably applies to the gene-ocide model,2 1 there is a strong
scholarly consensus that genocide applies only to the physical destruction of ex-
isting lives.212 For this reason, human rights organizations should analyze GLM as
a potential derivative of genocide called "gene-ocide." Although gene-ocide is
technically distinct from genocide, it is arguably underpinned and sustained by
similar social prejudices that seek to prevent rather than address deviation
13
to accomplish the same result See infra notes 250-76 and accompanying text (debating
whether people with genetic conditions deserve international protection as a protected
group).
208. See Fein, supra note 194, at 100 (criticizing Israel Charny for sinil-ar moral judg-
ment).
209. See WMsESR, supra note 1, at 356 (defining "definition" as a delineation or out-
line of the limits of a concept).
210. For instance, the fact that a racially-segregated lunch counter is less morally re-
pugnant than slavery does not make it a weaker example of racial discrimination, nor does it
make slavery less atrocious. Torture is torture v&ether the victim is an adult or a child.
211. Genocide Convention, supra note 143, arts. IWc)-(d) (discussing the physical de-
struction of and prevention of births within a group).
212. See Israel W. Chamy, Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide, in Gm~ocma:
CoNcEPTuAL AiD HISToRiCAL DInmSioNs, supra note 194, at 84 (restricting the concept of
genocide to mass murders that end existing lives).
213. See Chalk, supra note 194, at 58 (citing Sir Isiah Berlin, On the Pursuit of the
Ideal, N.Y. Rlv. oFBoons, Mar. 17, 1988 at 11-18 (discussing genocides aimed at main-
taining the superiority of a race)). The Draft Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
adopted in August 1994, prohibits cultural genocide. Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art 7, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1995/2, Aug. 26, 1994, re-
printed in, 34 LL.M. 541 (1995) [hereinafter Indigenous Peoples Declaration]. In doing so,
it recognizes a derivative of genocide that does not require the physical destruction of ex-
isting lives. See Chamy, supra note 212, at 84 (distinguishing cultural genocide because it
does not involve mass murder). The definition of cultural genocide in Article 7 includes acts
that deny cultural values, dispossession of land or resources, forced assimilation, and propa-
ganda. Indigenous Peoples Declaration, supra, art 7. Culture, like genetics, is a form of ex-
pression. See WEsmP, supra note 1, at 335 (defining "culture" as "style of social and ar-
tistic expression peculiar to a class or society"). Genetics deals with physical and behavioral
expression, while culture deals with artistic and interpersonal expression. Id. at 335, 525. By
integrating the concepts of culture and genocide, the Draft Declaration arguably recognizes
an international interest in protecting expressions of life. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31,
at 147 (quoting author Robert Morison who states that humans must safeguard the "richness
and variety of their heritage--their human gene pool and their common culture".
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2. Freedom of Genetic Expression: the Biodiversity Argument
The temporal implications 214 of genetic technology will require international
human rights organizations to revisit issues surrounding the rights of the unborn
that persist despite the abortion debate.215 Unlike abortion, GLM and genetic test-
ing can affect both existing and future fetuses.21 6 Like environmental conditions,
genetic technology can affect future generations as a collective.217 Consequently,
international law should address the rights of posterity from both an individual and
218a collective perspective, using international environmental law as a conceptual
guide.
219
Recent scholarly discussion focuses on the right of the individual fetus to be
free from genetic manipulation. 220 Some scholars point out that GLM essentially
214. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing the transgenerational ef-
fects of individual reproductive decisions involving the use of genetic tests or GLM).
215. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 275 (calling upon the Council of
Europe to draft definitions of rights of posterity); supra note 124 (explaining several failed
international attempts to extend the right to life to the fetus).
216. See supra note 44-46 and accompanying text (explaining that the effects of GLM
pass on to the patient's offspring).
217. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 266 (recognizing the threats that gene
therapy poses to rights of posterity); cf Douglas-Scott, supm note 77, at 434 (recognizing
the temporal nature of environmental rights).
218. See Maleiha Malik, Communal Goods as Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 139 (pointing out examples of group rights such as the
right to development, peace and security, existence, and self-determination). Groups, rather
than individuals, exercise collective rights. Id. at 142. Collective rights presume that the
welfare of an individual is inseparable from the welfare of his group. Id. Threats to collec-
tive rights ordinarily entail many relatively small actions that produce an aggregate effect.
Douglas-Scott, supra note 77, at 430. Collective rights in a genetic context imply that indi-
viduals do not have separate interests in human biodiversity. Id. Their interests hinge on
membership and interaction within a larger human community. Id. These rights are in-
fringed by the cumulative effect of individual applications of genetic technology, Id.
219. See Douglas-Scott, supra note 77, at 430 (arguing that the right to environment, if
it exists, should exist as a peoples' right). For further discussion on the development of in-
temational environmental law and the right to environment, see Alexandre Kiss, Concept
and Possible Implications of the Right to Environment, in HUMAN RioHTS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 551; Maguelonme Dejeant-Pons,
The Right to Environment in Regional Human Rights Systems, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TH
TWENTY-FiRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 595; GREENING
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Philippe Sands ed., 1993).
220. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 272 (asserting that GLM imposes cur-
rent aesthetic values on later generations); Recommendation 934, supra note 98, at 303 (ac-
knowledging the 'right to inherit a genetic pattern that has not been artificially changed").
Some courts in the United States recognized some form of this right, awarding damages to
individuals suing their parents for wrongful birth or negligent conduct during pregnancy.
See BRODY, supra note 32, at 79 (describing wrongful life lawsuits in the United States
where parents sued laboratories for inaccurate genetic diagnoses, and children sued parents
for failing to abort); Proctor, supra note 14, at 71 (stating that doctors who fail to counsel
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subjects descendants to medical procedures without their informed consent.22
They also argue that posterity should be free of the potential barms of therapies
performed by a medical community that does not fully understand how genes in-
teract.tm Although communal concerns seem to underpin these arguments, they
actually promote the right of individuals to enter the world unaffected by their
predecessors' genetic priorities.tm In effect, this right is a "descendant" of the right
to security of person guaranteed to individuals in the UDHR and ICCPRY 4
The technology debate has not addressed whether humans, both present and
future, have a collective right to live in a world that is genetically diverse. This ar-
gument imports policy concerns from international environmental law and applies
them to human genetics.22s The basis of this argument is that GLM, aided by em-
bryo diagnosis, may jeopardize human genetic diversitytm and that international
organizations should respond by recognizing that human genetic diversity is intrin-
sically valuable.227 Essentially, the biodiversity argument reconceptualizes the right
parents about the likelihood of giving birth to a child ith genetic conditions may be liable
for wrongful birth), HUBBARD & WAL, supra note 4, at 25-26 (quoting physician and attor-
ney Margery Shaw, who introduces "prenatal torts" as parental liability for carrying to term
a fetus vith a genetic defect); Dan E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Con-
flicts -ith Women's Constitutional Rights to Libery, Pracy, and Equal Protection, 95
YALE L.J. 599, 601-02 (1986) (stating that American common law has historically recog-
nized rights in fetuses contingent upon birth). In addition, concern for the welfare of future
generations is the impetus behind several international agreements addressing environ-
mental and cultural sustenance. See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration, Prin. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 48/14 (1972) (stating humanity's responsibility to "protect and improve the envi-
ronment for present and future generations"); Convention on Biological Diversity, pream-
ble, June 5, 1992,31 IL.M. 818 (1992) (advocating conservation of biological diversity "for
the benefit of present and future generations') [hereinafter Rio Convention]; Indigenous
Peoples Declaration, supra note 213, art 25 (stating that indigenous peoples have responsi-
bilities to their descendants to sustain and fortify their natural resources).
221. See Wxmm, supra note 46, at 161 (explaining that GLM requires parents to give
consent on behalf of their future child); Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 274 (arguing
that there is no informed consent ven the patient is an embryo).
222. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 114 (opposing GLM because mistakes
that occur in its application enter the family's hereditary line); Hendricks & Novrok, supra
note 96, at 266 (recognizing that GLM can cause disease in fiture generations).
223. See Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 272 (discussing parental use of GLM to
impose aesthetic values on their children).
224. UDHR, supra note 86, art 3; ICCPt, supra note 87, art 9.
225. For an introduction to international environmental law, see PHuWP SAaDS,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENvmomsNrAL LAW I, FAmswoms, STANDAPDS AND
IMPL-!ENTATION 368 (1995) (discussing the purposes of and international instruments ad-
dressing biological diversity).
226. See Lenoir, supra note 70, at 1261 (explaining that advances in genetic research
raise questions about the human role in biological diversity).
227. See SANDS, supra note 225, at 369 (explaining that international environmental
law protects biodiversity for non-scientific and aesthetic reasons); C-UnSTopam SToE,
SHOULD TRMS HA STANDING? (1974) (arguing for intrinsic rights in natural objects).
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to life in terms of the genetic diversity expressed throughout the human species. 228
Biodiversity receives international protection for three main reasons. 2 9 First, it
provides humans with a continual source of nutritional, pharmaceutical, and agri-
cultural resources.230 It gives them the raw materials they need to stay healthy and
achieve social, cultural, economic, and scientific goals that improve the quality of
human life.231 Similarly, diversity in human genetic expression endows people with
physical and behavioral differences that enrich social interactions, political de-
bates, literary works, and music.232 In this manner, conservation of human diversity
functions like copyright law, providing protection to original works in order to
generate a diverse pool of knowledge and creativity for people to tap. 3
Biodiversity also helps maintain atmospheric conditions that are favorable to
humans and other species.? Genetic diversity serves a similar purpose for hi-
mans, producing a genetic pool that is more fit for reproduction: 35 and a social at-
mosphere that cultivates tolerance and appreciation of cultural differences. 6
Finally, biodiversity receives protection for non-scientific ethical and aesthetic
purposes. 237 This purpose, unlike the first two, focuses on the intrinsic rather than
the utilitarian value of diversity s8 It assumes that natural diversity has value sepa-
rate from that which humans assign it.239 Following this reasoning, human genetic
diversity deserves protection because it enriches the world.
240
228. Rio Convention, supra note 220, art. 2 (defining "biodiversity" as the variability
among living organisms).
229. SANDS, supra note 225, at 368.
230. Id.
231. Id. (discussing rapid species and habitat loss).
232. Cf Rio Declaration, supra note 220, preamble (recognizing the social, economic,
scientific, educational, and cultural value of biological diversity); DEL, Russo, supra note 86,
at 59 (presenting genocide as a loss of cultural contributions).
233. COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.04 (Joyce et al. eds., 3d ed., 1994) (stating that copyright en-
courages the creation of knowledge to promote the public welfare).
234. SANDs, supra note 225, at 369.
235. See MARKs, supra note 172, at 173-74 (explaining that genetically diverse popula-
tions are better equipped for survival).
236. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 147 (quoting author Robert Morison, who
states that people's survival and welfare depends both on their genetic composition and
cultural exchange with others); supra note 81 and accompanying text (arguing that genetic
technology may generate intolerance toward people who fall short of technically achievable
ideals).
237. SANDS, supra note 225, at 369.
238. Rio Convention, supra note 220, preamble (recognizing the intrinsic value of bio-
logical diversity).
239. Douglas-Scott, supra note 77, at 441 (analyzing the intrinsic value argument for a
right to environment).
240. Id. at 444. By analogy, Jeremy Waldron argues that killing a tree is bad not be-
cause it denies humans use of a resource, but because the world is impoverished by the
tree's absence. Id. For a comprehensive discussion on the rights of natural objects, see gen-
erally STONE, supra note 227.
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The human biodiversity argument warrants several criticisms. Environmental
instruments may not apply to the genetics debate because GLM cannot realistically
jeopardize genetic diversity to the same degree as environmental destructiol 241
Unlike GLM, environmental damage caused by human activity seriously threatens
the existence of several species and can substantially alter the living conditions that
future organisms must endure.?42 Although many scientists do not consider GLM
an immense threat to the human gene pool,2 43 they concur that it jeopardizes the
manner in which humans view and value one another.2 " Like slavery and segrega-
tion, human and non-human biodiversity imply unequal threats but originate in the
same social attitudes.245
It is also conceptually difficult to grant rights to non-living objects or humans
who are not yet in existence.246 The concept of rights as a whole seems to imply
the ability to demand, exercise, and enforce those rights.2 47 This cannot occur when
the victim, whether by nature or timing; is not a part of human society For this
reason, some scholars assert that vesting rights in the unborn or the inanimate
would render existing rights unenforceable.2 49
C. GENETIC GROUPS AS APROTECTED CLASS
The potential for discrimination against genetic groups increases dramatically as
genetic testing and GLM techniques become less expensive, more reliable, and
more widely available.250 For this reason, genetic groups arguably deserve recog-
241. See Rio Convention, supra note 220, preamble (noting that human activities cause
significant redactions of biological diversity).
242. See SAmNs, supra note 225, at 369 (discussing 1992 estimates that if species and
habitat loss continues at the current rate, fifteen percent of the earth's species xill die out
over twenty-five years).
243. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (arguing that GLM cannot eliminate ge-
netic traits from the entire human gene pool).
244. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (arguing that broad use of genetic
technology can create genetically-defined standards of physical and behavioral normality).
245. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (arguing that moral repugnancy alone
does not determine whether a definition is applicable).
246. Douglas-Scott, supra note 77, at 446-47.
247. See id at 443 (discussing the theory that holders of rights must understand moral
principles, possess critical capacities, and have self-avareness).
248. Id. at 447 (arguing that rights are man-made and should not be applied outside of
human society).
249. See, e.g., Mike Radford, Can Rights Extend to Animals?, in UrxnsrArm rn:
HUMANRiGHTS, supra note 77, at 411-18 (discussing the historical tradition excluding ani-
mals from a "rights" framewvork); Douglas-Scott, supra note 77, at 447 (arguing that appli-
cation of rights to natural objects damages their value in human contexts); Palkhivala, supra
note 137, at 442 (arguing against the devaluation of human rights by overexTansiony, John-
sen, supra note 220, at 614-15 (asserting that the exTansion of fetal rights may intrude on
women's autonomy rights).
250. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at 134 (predicting a sharp ise in the use of
genetic tests as they become cheaper to develop and purchase).
1997]
AM. U J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
nition as a protected class under international human rights law.2'
Traditionally, human rights law protects groups of individuals who exhibit cer-
tain characteristics.25 2 Groups worthy of legal status exist naturally, often based on
characteristics beyond their members' control. 3 The individuals in the group
share more than common interests or discriminatory experiences; 254 they share
identity. 5 Their welfare as individuals is determined in part by the welfare of the
group-26 Historical and cultural ties unify them and distinguish them from oth-
ers.2 7 Thus, group status arises from a sense of belonging among group members
and recognition from the international community.2 8
Genetic groups clearly exhibit the objective factors of group identity.2 9 They
face discrimination based on biological factors which, like race and ethnicity, are
beyond their control. 26° Thus, their common interest is naturally, not voluntarily,
created.26' Yet ironically, gene testing and GLM provoke discrimination based on
genetic status2 62 while simultaneously providing the means to alter that status. 263 At
251. See iles, supra note 4, at 45 (noting that genetic information may create a new
source of group identity).
252. See supra note 125 (discussing groups protected against discrimination by the In-
temational Bill of Human Rights).
253. NATAN LERER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29
(1991). Race and ethnicity are good examples. Id. at 30-31. By contrast, organizations and
clubs cannot be protected groups because their members voluntarily establish them. Id. (ar-
guing that artificial or planned groups do not earn protected status); see also Aviam Soifer,
On Being Overly Discrete and Insular. Involuntary Groups and the Anglo-American Judi-
cial Tradition, 1990 ISRAEL Y.B. Huh. RTS. 243, 245 (distinguishing voluntary associations
from groups exhibiting innate, immutable traits).
254. See LERNER, supra note 253, at 32 (arguing that homosexuals do not earn group
status because their group identification arises from experiences of discrimination rather
than historical affiliation).
255. See Shaw, supra note 142, at 40-41 (discussing the minority as a mechanism to
preserve identity).
256. See LERNER, supra note 253, at 29 (quoting author Owen Fiss who states that
group members define their individual well-being partly in terms of their group's well-
being).
257. Id. at 33; see also Shaw, supra note 142, at 35 (arguing that minorities must be
objectively distinct from other groups within a state).
258. See Shaw, supra note 142, at 39 (requiring that group members intend to exist as a
group); LERNER, supra note 253, at 34 (naming the decisive indicators of group identity as
self-perception and perception of surrounding communities).
259. See Shaw, supra note 142, at 27 (recognizing objective and subjective criteria for
minorities).
260. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (explaining that group status can arise
from factors beyond the control of its members).
261. See id. (explaining that voluntary associations cannot earn group protection).
262. See supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text (describing discriminatory practices
that can result from widespread use of genetic technology).
263. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (explaining that GLM allows people
to permanently alter the genetic make-up of their descendants).
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the very least, gene manipulation can create the social perception that genetic con-
ditions are within human control, weakening the argument for protected status. -
Genetic groups do not exhibit the subjective indicators of group status. Their
members do not identify themselves by their genetic composition.26 People with
genetic conditions worry about the welfare of their families and descendants rather
than a larger genetic community.2 They do not exist as transnational units, but as
dispersed aggregates protected to varying degrees by national and local laivs.o
Self-perceptions can change as discriminatory practices become widespread, how-
ever.2 69 Growing acceptance of genetic reductionism, reinforced by exclusion from
employment and insurance opportunities, may unify genetic groups on a global
level.270 Discrimination may create the group identification that currently does not
exist.271
Perceptions should not determine group status in the technology context by as-
suming that victims can perceive discrimination2 72 Biotechnology widens the
scope of people vulnerable to discrimination because it cloaks discriminatory atti-
tudes in the prestige and procedure of science.273 Because genetic discrimination is
invisible, its victims often do not notice it and therefore do not identify with other
victims. 27 4 Consequently, victims of genetic discrimination are more vulnerable
264. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (arguing that GIM can create societal
assumptions that genetic conditions are avoidable).
265. Cf Hendricks & Nowak, supra note 96, at 251 (arguing that, in theory, illness
does not affect a person's legal status).
266. See Eide, supra note 142, at 89 (indicating several separate levels at which group
identification can occur).
267. See Billings Surveys, supra note 2, at 640-42 (describing the situations of famnilies
wrho risk losing their health insurance by testing for or giving birth to a child ith a genetic
condition); supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text (explaining that the purpose of GLM
is to prevent or alter genetic conditions in descendants).
268. See Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 70 (discussing various national regulatory
schemes for biotechnology issues). By contrast, racial characteristics often bind people in a
manner that transcends national borders. Id.
269. See Eide, supra note 142, at 89-90 (recognizing that group identification is a dy-
namic process of shifting alliances).
270. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining that genetic technology may
foster genetic determinism).
271. See Eide, supra note 142, at 90, 97 (recognizing that discriminatory attitudes from
a dominant society can activate group identification). But see LEanan, supra note 253, at 32
(arguing that discriminatory treatment does not create group identity).
272. Darison M. Douglas, Constitutional Lm: The Quest for Freedom in the Post-
Brown South. Desegregation and White Self-Interest, 70 CHL-KENT L. REv. 639, 714 (not-
ing that black Americans vo entered 'Vhite Only" lunch counters in early 1960s con-
fronted obvious discrimination in the form of signs and brutal treatment).
273. See Franklin, supra note 165, at 735 (describing how technology makes discrimi-
nation go unnoticed by replacing human supervision vith mechanical supvision),
Somerville, supra note 74 (explaining traditional assumptions that medicine is motivated by
philanthropy and, therefore, cannot be a source of human rights violations).
274. For example, employers can discriminate against job applicants by using genetic
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than others who face more obvious forms of discimination2 7 5 The invisibility of
genetic discrimination arguably reinforces the need for international protection of
genetic groups.
276
III. CREATING A DICTIONARY
No international instrument currently in force addresses the human rights impli-
cations of genetic testing and gene therapy. As scientific progress accelerates, 7
more scholars call upon international human rights organizations to reopen discus-
sions on genetic technology and promulgate a set of principles representing the
collective view of the international community. 278
Two organizations accepted the challenge. In June 1996, the Council of Europe
Steering Committee on Bioethics279 (CDBI) issued its second Draft Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to
the Application of Biology and Medicine (Bioethics Convention). 280 In March
tests to weed out potentially unproductive employees. HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 4, at
139. Because employers are not accountable to applicants, however, applicants often do not
perceive the discrimination and therefore have no impetus to unite. Id.
275. Cf Scheflin, supra note 170, at 842 n.42 (arguing that mind control is more dan-
gerous than homelessness, torture, or imprisonment because it is less visible and concrete).
276. See Douglas-Scott, supra note 77, at 443 (acknowledging that the groups most
vulnerable to abuse are most deserving of legal protection).
277. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 145 (stating that GLM research is advancing
quickly).
278. See id. at 151 (advocating continuing public debate about GLM application);
Thomas H. Murray, Speaking Unsmooth Things about the Human Genome Project, in GEM
MAPPING: UsNG LAW AND ETmIcs As GuIDEs, supra note 3, at 253 (calling for public dis-
cussion and criticism of emerging genetic innovations); LeRoy Walters, A National Advi-
sory Committee on Genetic Testing and Screening, in Gm MAPPIN: UsING LAW AND
ETICS AS GUIDES, supra note 3, at 261 (advocating creation of National Advisory Com-
mittee on Genetic Testing and Screening to debate ethical ramifications of emerging tech-
nologies).
279. The Council of Europe, established in 1949 with thirty-four member states, is a
pioneer of the bioethics debate. Iles, supra note 4, at 38. The Council's Parliamentary As-
sembly, which has 239 members from the national parliaments of the member states, has
issued recommendations to guide the advancement of genetic research since 1976. RoGEts
& DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 14, at 209. The Council created the Steering Committee on
Bioethics (CDBI) in order to draft a bioethics convention and accompanying protocols. Id.
The CDBI comprises sixty appointed experts, representatives of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly and European Commission, and observers from non-member states and international
organizations. Id.
280. Eur. Parl. Ass. Doc. No. 7622 (visited Apr. 7, 1997)
<http://stars.coe.fr/doc/adocO496/adoc7622/htm> [hereinafter Bioethics Convention]. CDBI
plans to rename the draft the "Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine" at some
point in the future. Provisional Report to the Bioethics Convention (visited Apr. 7, 1997) <
http'//stars.coe.fr/doc/adocO496/adoc7622/htm> [hereinafter Provisional Report].
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1996, the UNESCO International Bioethics CommitteeP' issued the most recent
version of its Preliminary Draft of a Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights2 (UNESCO Declaration) which it hopes to adopt in 1998.
Both documents use human rights language and themes to establish the moral
guidelines of scientific research28
4
To varying degrees, the UNESCO Declaration and the Bioethics Convention
recognize and address the challenges that biotechnology presents for traditional
human rights analyses. Both instruments emanate from the right of human dignity
embodied in the UDHR 85 and implicitly recognize the broad effects of genetic
technology by acknowledging the importance of the human being as a member of
the human species.2 6 Both instruments recognize that health care professionals and
researchers can initiate human rights violations, z yet neither specifically ad-
dresses the potential for discrimination by employers, insurers, and other private
actors outside the scientific community.m Although both recognize the right of
281. The United Nations formed UNESCO to promote human rights in the educational,
scientific, and cultural arenas. UNESCO Secretariat, UNESCO and the Challenges of Today
and Tomorrow: Universal Affirmation of Human Rights, in HumAN Ricits: THiRTY YEARs
AFrm Tm UNvEasAL DECLARATiON, supra note 84, at 207. UNESCO formed the Interna-
tional Bioethics Committee in 1992 to draft an international instrument to protect the human
genome based on human rights principles and multiculturalism. Lenoir, supra note 70, at
1263. The Committee comprises fifty members from forty states. Id.
282. CIP/BIO/96/COMJUR.62 (Prov. 5), Mar. 4, 1996 [hereinafter UNESCO Declara-
tion].
283. Lenoir, supra note 70, at 1264.
284. See UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, preamble (referring to UNESCO's
Constitution which documents the importance of human rights principles and international
human rights instruments); Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, preamble (aclmowledg-
ing the need to safeguard human dignity).
285. UDHR, supra note 86, preamble; UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, pream-
ble; Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, preamble.
286. See Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, preamble (promoting respect for humnan
beings as members of human species); UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, at 4 (pro-
tecting individuals in order to preserve the integrity of the human species
287. The Bioethics Convention requires health care professionals to apply genetic tech-
nology in accordance with professional standards. Bioethics Convention, supra note 280,
art. 4; Draft Explanatory Report to the 1994 Draft Bioethics Convention [hereinafter Draft
Report], reprinted in RoGERs & DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 14, at 261. The UNESCO Decla-
ration emphasizes the special responsibilities of the research and development community
and limits the conduct of health care professionals administering genetic interventions.
UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, arts. 7, 13 (stressing the duty of researchers to dis-
play "meticulousness, caution and intellectual honesty").
288. See UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, art 9 (calling for the protection of per-
sonal genetic information from "third parties" without identifying the "third parties" or the
threats that they pose); Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, art. 12 (restricting the use of
predictive genetic tests to "health purposes" without specifying to vhom the restrictions ap-
ply or why).
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every individual to be free of harm caused by genetic technology,289 neither ex-
plicitly recognizes the collective right of humanity to an unmanipulated genome.
Like the International Bill of Rights, the UNESCO Declaration and the
Bioethics Convention fail to define the basic concept of personhoodm The in-
strunents refer to human beings, individuals, and persons repeatedly"' but do not
specify whether these classifications extend to embryos.292 In particular, neither
instrument addresses whether performing GLM on embryos violates the doctrine
of informed consentm Neither instrument addresses the rights of the embryo in
relation to the rights of its parents to control its upbringing. 94
The Bioethics Convention more clearly recognizes the temporal implications of
genetic testing and GLM. The preamble recognizes the interests of present and
future generations.295 Article 13 of the Convention prohibits GLM but does not in-
dicate a reason. 2 6 A draft report issued by CDBI to facilitate the application of the
Convention reveals the drafters' concern that scientific knowledge about GLM is
presently so limited that applications would pose unknown dangers to future gen-
erations.2 97 Thus, although the Convention does not stipulate that posterity has a
collective right to a GLM-free genome, concern for future generations Underlies
these provisions.298 The only temporal reference in the UNESCO Declaration is a
description of the human genome as part of humanity's "common heritage."z  Far
from acknowledging collective rights in future generations, the reference to "heri-
tage" merely recognizes posterity as an interested party in biotechnological issues.
The UNESCO Declaration more thoroughly addresses the diffusive effects of
gene testing and GLM. Besides recognizing the individual as a member of the
289. See UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, preamble (stating that individuals have
a right to reparation for injuries resulting from applications of genetic technology);
Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, art. 24 (entitling persons who suffer from the harmful
effects of genetic technology to compensation).
290. Draft Report, supra note 287, at 268 (acknowledging that the Bioethics Conven-
tion fails to define "everyone" or "human being").
291. See UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, art. 2 (referring to "individuals" and
"everyone"); Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, arts. 1, 2, 5, 7 (referring to "human be-
ings," "persons" and "individuals").
292. See Draft Report, supra note 287, at 268. (acknowledging that human dignity must
be respected when life begins).
293. Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, arts. 5-9. The Convention, which provides
detailed guidance on the issue of consent, does not specify whether an embryo is a person
"not able to consent." Id. art. 6. It addresses incapacitation of adults and children only. Id.
294. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (arguing that genetic technology, like
abortion, implicates the rights of individuals against each other rather than the state).
295. Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, preamble (asserting that scientific advances
must benefit present and future generations).
296. Id. art. 13 (prohibiting the manipulation of gern cells).
297. Draft Report, supra note 287, at 285.
298. Id. (projecting that the Council of Europe ethics committees may not approve
therapies that affect subsequent generations).
299. UNESCO Declaration, supra note 282, preamble.
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human species, the Declaration, in several articles, emphasizes that genetic tech-
nology has implications for all humanity.300 Unlike the Convention, it identifies the
biodiversity parallel by recognizing the relevance of the United Nations Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity and emphasizing the importance of human biodiver-
sity.30 1 In doing so, it implicitly recognizes the broad impact of individual deci-
sions and alludes to an intrinsic right of human biodiversity.302 Neither instrument
expressly acknowledges the aggregate effect of individual decisions.3 3
Both instruments explicitly prohibit discrimination based on genetic traits, thus
granting legal protection to genetic groups.3 4 Surprisingly, however, the Bioethics
Convention does not address the dangers of genetic reductionism and eugenics. As
a result, it loses much of its definitional value, like a dictionary with missing
pages. Article One, which articulates the purpose of the Convention, vaguely guar-
antees respect for integrity without discrimination.30 5 Article 12 limits the use of
genetic testing to health-related purposes but does not identify the actors that it
limits. °3 0 Although the Provisional Report to the Bioethics Convention clearly rec-
ognizes the dangers of genetic determinism, eugenics, and discrimination by em-
ployers and insurers,3° 7 the drafters do not incorporate this recognition into the text
of the Convention where it would be most effectual. The Convention, therefore,
identifies the effects of genetic discrimination, but fails to explain its sources and
implications.
303
By contrast; the UNESCO Declaration does address the social forces underlying
genetic testing and GLM The Declaration responds to genetic reductionism by
stating that environmental, social, health, and economic factors all contribute to the
development of the human personality.309 Recognizing the potential for a eugenics
revival, it prohlbits any eugenic practice that "rims counter to human dignity and
human rights." 310 Although the Declaration does not enumerate which practices are
300. See id. (recognizing the benefits of scientific research to humankind); i art. 4
(acknowledging the potential threat of genetic technology to the integrity of the human spe-
cies); id. art 11 (calling upon states to support research efforts to improve the health of hu-
mankind).
301. Id. (emphasizing the importance of human biodiversity).
302. Id. (recognizing that social or political attitudes may threaten human diversity and
the dignity of the human family).
303. les, supmra note 4, at 42-43.
304. Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, art. 11; UNESCO Declaration, supm note
282, art. 8. Article 2(c) of the UNESCO Declaration reinforces the Article S prohibition,
guaranteeing respect for human dignity and rights ' regardless of [genetic] characteristics."
Id. art. 2(c).
305. Bioethics Convention, supra note 280, art. 1.
306. Id. art. 12.
307. Provisional Report, supra note 280, at paras. 16, 18.
308. Id. The draflers' failure to address these fundamental concerns undermines their
attempt to "give a clear signal on this subject" Id. at para. 17.
309. Id. art. 2(c), 3 (stating that the human personality is not the product of a genetic
formula).
310. Id. art 1.
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acceptable, 31' its specific language creates a strong moral response to the threat of
genetic discrimination. The UNESCO Declaration is superior in this regard be-
cause it more effectively confronts the social apathy that allows genetic discrimi-
nation to occur.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Genetic technology is coming. Governments continue to postpone regulation
on the assumption that it is a distant reality.312 Yet the recent development of the
DNA Chip313 and non-traditional cloning methods 314 brings this reality into clear
view. As scientists overcome technical problems and the futuristic looms nearer,
governments will have to reconsider the ethical implications of genetic technology
and re-regulate its availability.
A. PROPOSED DEFINITIONS
Regulation requires language, language requires definitions, and definitions
change with technological capability. Genetic testing and GLM magnify human
rights violations conceptually: they shift power from few hands to many,' 15 raise
stakes from an individual to a collective level,316 and affect the health of families
for centuries to come.317 Whether governments employ human rights principles to
restrict or widen the availability of genetic technology, they need a human rights
311. Id.
312. See Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 151 (discussing the de facto moratorium on
GLM); Draft Report, supra note 287, at 285 (stating that the drafters of the Bioethics Con-
vention did not provide exceptions to the GLM ban because GLM techniques remain unde-
veloped).
313. The DNA Chip is a glass microchip covered by a layered carpet of DNA fibers
programmed to recognize and display specific gene sequences with the aid of a florescent
solution. Nicholas Wade, Meeting of Computers and Biology: The DNA Chip, N.Y. Tamms,
Apr. 8, 1997, at Cl, C6. Scientists select the DNA sequences they want to test from a
worldwide genetic database accessed through the Internet Id. at C6. The chip measures
gene expression and detects mutations that may foster predispositions toward certain dis-
eases. Id. Experts are currently creating more powerful versions of the chip that will allow
scientists to predict a person's susceptibility to diseases much more quickly than current
methods allow. Id.
314. See Sharon Begley, Little Lamb, Who Made Thee?, NEwswsnx, Mar. 10, 1997, at
53, 56-57 (detailing the process by which Scottish scientists created a lamb from the udder
cell of a sheep); John Travis, Two Monkeys 'Cloned' From Embryo Cells, Sel. NEws, Mar.
8, 1997, at 142 (discussing "nuclear transfer," a procedure similar to cloning, which enabled
the creation of two rhesus monkeys from the cells of a developing monkey embryo).
315. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text (discussing the transfer of human
rights violations from states to social institutions).
316. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (explaining how technological in-
novations affect larger numbers of people).
317. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of GLM on
subsequent generations).
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language that is as state-of-the-art and progressive as the technology itself31 s Ac-
cordingly, this Comment proposes the following definitions in order to integrate
spatial and temporal considerations into the human rights analysis:
Violator: a government, or a private institution or company exerting specialized
authority that is analogous to a government that fails to comply with or ensure in-
temational human rights obligations.
31 9
Victim: a group, discrete or dispersed throughout society, or a private individ-
ual, existing currently or in the future, who either knowingly or unknowingly suf-
fer(s) a human rights violation.
2°
This Comment also proposes the revision of the anti-discrimination clauses in
the IBHR to condemn discrimination based ongenetic disposition.
32
1
The development of reliable insertion techniques may reveal a need for interna-
tional recognition of gene-ocide and a right to genetic expression 3m If interna-
tional human rights organizations choose to permit GLM in certain circumstances,
they should incorporate a cost-benefit analysis into the definition of gene-ocide 3m
as proposed in the following definition:
Gene-ocide: the application of GLM techniques by a health care professional in
order to alter an embryo or sex cell genetically, where the danger of harm to the
developing fetus exceeds the seriousness of the disease under treatment.324
By weighing the harmful effects of the disease with those of the therapy, this
definition discourages the use of genetic technology to effectuate social preju-
dice,325 while preserving a collective right to human genetic diversity that should
be limited only in cases of severe pain or impairment In the interim, interna-
318. See Rodley, supra note 166, at 299 (promoting evolving definitions of human
rights).
319. Id at 300 (redefining human rights to incorporate quasi-public actors).
320. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing how technology expands
the pool of human rights victims); WFBsnsmn, supra note 1, at 1286 (defining "victim" as
"one harmed by or made to suffer from an act, circumstance, agency or condition").
321. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing anti-discrimination clauses
of the ]BHR).
322. See supra note 33 (discussing research efforts to develop accurate methods of gene
insertion).
323. See Proctor, supra note 14, at 67 (suggesting that gene manipulation is acceptable
in certain circumstances).
324. It is illogical to fault researchers for the development of genetic technology but
simultaneously allow its application in certain situations. See Poliy Issues, supra note 78, at
16 (discussing the need for social policy input prior to the use of genetic technology in order
to minimize the harms of technology). Consequently, this definition places liability on phy-
sicians and their agents, who are in a better position to weigh the potential benefit and harm
of GLM application. Elias & Annas, supra note 31, at 271.
325. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (explaining that applications of ge-
netic technology may lead to genetic discrimination and idealized notions of health and
normality).
326. See supra note 67 (distinguishing between serious and mild dimbilities); Proctor,
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tional human rights organizations should adopt these analogies as models for dis-
cussion.
Ultimately, the value of the biodiversity and gene-ocide models will depend on
the overall objective of the international human rights system. If its purpose is to
classify wrongs according to moral repugnancy or enforcement capability, the
analogies are inadequate. They are instrumental, however, in addressing the atti-
tudes and assumptions behind human rights violations. Because the international
human rights framework has no efficient method of enforcement,3 27 it must rely on
the power of its language as its most effective tool to frame the debate of policy-
making.328 By providing human rights organizations with the opportunity to build
an effective language, scientific advancement invites them to do what they do
best-set a moral agenda.
B. EDITNG THE DICTIONARY
The human rights debate on genetic technology is necessarily international.3
As a matter of principle, the level of control that existing humans assert over future
humans and each other should not hinge on jurisdiction. The instruments proposed
by UNESCO and the Council of Europe will serve a crucial function as dictionar-
ies of human rights principles, providing state policymakers with moral and defi-
nitional guidance.330 For this reason, their language must be specific and strong
enough to convey a moral message. To serve effectively as reference materials, the
UNESCO Declaration and the Bioethics Convention must do more than address
the effects of human rights violations; they must specifically recognize the
causes.
331
To this end, the Bioethics Convention and the UNESCO Declaration should
amend their preambles to explicitly recognize the social perceptions that underlie
human rights violations, including genetic reductionism, eugenic philosophies, and
prejudices against the disabled and socially deviant Both instruments should ex-
supra note 14, at 67 (arguing that permitting disease does not enhance human diversity).
327. See Bilder, supra note 16, at 900 (explaining that there is no international police
force to compel state compliance Vithjudgments from international human rights courts).
328. See Iles, supra note 4, at 59 (recommending the drafting of a detailed international
instrument to guide policy-making in individual countries).
329. See Somerville, supra note 74, at 874 (arguing that because biotechnology is
"transnational, transcultural and transdisciplinary," human rights responses to biotechnology
must be as well).
330. Recommendation 1160 on the Preparation of a Convention on Bioethics, Eur. Parl.
Ass. Doc. No. 6449 (1991), reprinted in ROGERS & DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 14, at 320-21
(recommending the drafting of a bioethics convention as an international source of general
principles and protocols).
331. See Theo van Boven, Prevention of Human Rights Violations, in HUMAN RioHTs
iN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 940 (asserting
that international organizations should address human rights violations by confronting their
causes rather than their symptoms).
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plicitly recognize the power of private actors such as employers, insurers, schools,
and adoption agencies to foster discrimination through screening practices. Fi-
nally, both instruments should recognize that genetic technology produces far-
reaching power by aggregating the effects of many individual actions and influ-
encing subsequent generations.
C. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
The genetics debate illustrates the symbiotic relationship between human rights
and scientific progress.332 Human rights language keeps human experience at the
forefront of research agendas, reminding scientists that their power can harm as
well as help people.33 3 In return, science gives the human rights framework tools
to remain responsive to the needs of human rights victims. First, science provides
international human rights organizations with an upgraded language that enables
them to adapt to technological change and evolving definitions of human rights
violations.334 By assuming the role of the human rights violator, the scientific
community can also make states open to the human rights agenda. Marc Bossuyt
335
argues that the "inherent weakness" of the traditional human rights system is that it
requires states to condemn their own violations .33 Scientific issues allow states to
protect their citizens from violations by social actors.3 37 As a result, human rights
become the tool rather than the enemy of state policy, encouraging state coopera-
tion with human rights organizations.
Genetic technology, in particular, allows human rights organizations to play an
active role in preventing human rights violations. Because scientists can predict the
development of techniques years in advance,339 human rights organizations have
time to reassess and update their language, organize themselves, and promote their
agenda before human rights violations occur. Rather than reacting to violations af-
ter they happen, organizations can use this lag-time to help states formulate poli-
332. See Lenoir, supra note 70, at 1264 (stating that human history goes hand-in-hand
with scientific advancement).
333. Iles, supra note 4, at 28. But see Kingston, supra note 109, at 476 (arguing that the
human rights framework oversimplifies complex issues).
334. See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (proposing new definitions of
"violator" and "victim").
335. Mr. Bossayt is a professor of international law at the University of Antwerp and
Former Chairman of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Bossuyt, supra note 72, at 47.
336. Id. at50.
337. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (discussing the rective role of the
state within the context of technological advancement).
338. See id at 1 (calling genetic research "predictive medicine" because it vams soi-
ety about coming developments); Culliton, supra note 37, at (quoting Senator (now Vice-
President) Albert Gore, who states that the predictability of scientific advances permits con-
sideration of their ethical implications); Andy Coghlan, Time to Reopen the Germ-Line
File?, NEW SCmNTST, Nov. 27, 1993, at 4-5 (quoting LeRoy Walters and Doris Zallen, who
argue that the time required to develop GLM permits discussion of ethical concerns).
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cies that prevent violations from occurring. Predictive medicine339 may bring about
the "rebirth" of the human rights organization by transforming it into an active
player in the policy-making process.340 Through science, human rights organiza-
tions can learn some preventive medicine of their own.341
D. TEACHING THE LANGUAGE
To make the most of this opportunity, human rights organizations should up-
grade their role as well as their language.342 They should do more than draft inter-
national dictionaries, since dictionaries are only useful when people pull them off a
shelf.343 Although human rights principles are defined at the international level,
they are implemented at the state level. 3 " Thus, human rights organizations must
focus their efforts on the state policy-making arena.
Groups like the International Bioethics Committee and CDBI should function
like consulting firms, sending out teams of experts3 45 to market the upgraded hu-
man rights language in state regulatory proceedings.346 Groups should implement
this advisory function on two levels. First, teams should testify or lobby at regula-
tory proceedings as representatives of the international community to ensure that
human rights concerns frame the debate. Second, teams should collaborate with
local human rights groups in each state to teach them how to translate human rights
arguments into legislation. Thus, human rights organizations can maximize their
influential power by approaching state leaders from both outside and inside state
339. Powledge, supra note 22, at 1 (referring to fields of science where researchers can
predict upcoming technologies).
340. See Franklin, supra note 165, at 735 (arguing that human rights organizations must
intervene at the planning stage of human rights violations).
341. See van Boven, supra note 331, at 938 (arguing that human rights, like medicine,
should focus on prevention rather than treatment).
342. See id. at 608 (arguing that the international community should prepare itself for
progress so that it can function effectively in the coming century).
343. See Bilder, supra note 16, at 900 (stating that international human rights law ulti-
mately relies on the voluntary compliance of states).
344. Id. (stating that international human rights law centers on international rules and
bodies to formulate policy and domestic law to implement policy).
345. Ideally, the teams would consist of scientists, human rights experts, and political
analysts from every region of the world. See Somerville, supra note 74, at 874 (stating that
human rights responses to biotechnology must be tranmational and transculturl). Nation-
ally diverse teams would be well-equipped to address differences in culture and regulatory
procedure among nations. See Jan Martenson, The United Nations and Human Rights Today
and Tomorrow, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENOE,
supra note 72, at 929 (recommending increased participation of people from various states
in issues affecting their lives).
346. See Van Bueren, supra note 87, at 605-06 (advocating an advisory role for human
rights organizations in order to prevent or ameliorate violations). Cf ButRaENTHAL, supra
note 16, at 250 (discussing the significant contributions of non-governmental organizations
as international human rights consultants). Essentially, this role represents a human rights
application of the "Think Globally, Act Locally" slogan.
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reg,.latory structures.
CONCLUSION
Scholars often compare geneticists to astronauts who bravely explore the un-
known frontiers of outer space.3 47 Ironically, the genetics race is more dangerous
because it is local. Development and application of genetic technology will ulti-
mately affect how humans value themselves and treat one another. Behind all at-
tempts to decode or alter the human genome is a global search for human identity.
By spearheading this search, the scientific community can redefine life as humans
know it By providing a dynamic language, human rights organizations can rede-
fine life as humans want to know it
347. Policy Issues, supra note 78, at 4; Roanna & DE BousnzGEN supra note 16, at 15
(calling the human genome a 'ew cosmos"); see also HuBBARD & VAmW, supra note 4, at
vii (quoting James Watson: "We used to think our fate was in the stars. Now we kmow, in
large measure, our fate is in our genes.'.
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